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THE AGENCY ClASS ACTION 
Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio* & AdamS. Zimmerman** 
The number of claims lang;uishing on administrative dockets has 
become a "crisis, " producing significant backlogs, arbitrary outcomes, 
and new barriers to justice. Coal miners, disabled employees, and 
wounded soldiers sit on endless waitlists to appeal similar administra-
tive decisions that frequently result in reversal. Defrauded consumers 
miss out on fair compensation, as agencies settle their claims with 
wrongdoers without victim participation or meaningful judicial over-
sight. 
Reformers appropriately call for more resources, administrative law 
judges, and attorneys'fees. But surprisingly, commentators have ignored 
tools long used by courts to resolve common claims raised by groups of 
people: class actions and complex litigation procedures. Almost no ad-
ministrative agency allows groups to aggregate and resolve common 
claims in adjudication. Accordingly, in a variety of adjudicatory pro-
ceedings, agencies routinely (1) waste resources on repetitive cases, ( 2) 
reach inconsistent decisions for similar claims, and ( 3) deny individu-
als access to fair representation that aggregate procedures promise. 
Moreover, procedural hurdles often prevent courts from providing class-
wide relief to parties in agency adjudication. 
This Article arg;ues that agencies themselves should adopt aggrega-
tion procedures, like those under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to adjudicate common claims. After surveying current tools 
by which agencies could promote more efficiency, consistency, and legal 
access, this Article finds that agency class action rules more effectively re-
solve common disputes by ( 1) efficiently creating ways to pool infor-
mation about recurring problems; (2) achieving greater equality zn 
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outcomes than individual adjudication; and (3) securing legal and ex-
pert assistance at a critical stage in the process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a crisis in administrative law. 1 The elusive promise of indi-
vidual hearings for deserving claimants has pushed caseloads to the 
breaking point, producing significant backlogs, disparate decisions, and 
new barriers to justice in many different agencies. In one year, Veterans 
Law Judges decided 729 veterans' benefits cases per judge2 after some 
veterans waited for over four years to fully adjudicate their claims,3 often 
without the benefit of counsel.4 By the end of june 2012, the number of 
pending cases in immigration courts reached an all-time high of 
314,147,5 with over 1,000 cases per judge,6 yielding average wait times of 
l. Over the past several years, problems in many different administrative courts have 
been altematively described as a "crisis," "a form of purgatory," "impractical," "a spin at 
the wheel of fate," and involving "due process violations." See Veterans for Common Sense 
v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 887 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding "due process violations in the 
[Veterans Benefits Administration] claims adjudication process"), vacated en bane, 678 
F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012); Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration 
Court System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 12th Con g. 1 (2011) [here-
inafter Ensuring Justice in Immigration] (statement of Karen T. Grisez, Chair, American 
Bar Association Commission on Immigration) (arguing immigration court system is "in 
crisis");Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholdtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals for Reform 6 (2009) [hereinafter Ramji-
Nogales et al., Proposals for Reform] (describing asylum applications as "a spin of the 
wheel of fate"); Erik Eckholm, Disability Cases Last Longer As Backload Rises, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 10, 2007, at AI (describing 500-day waiting periods for Social Security appeals hear-
ings as "purgatory"); Press Release, Office of Senator Jay Rockefeller, Rockefeller Releases 
GAO Report on Black Lung Benefits (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http:/ /rockefeller. 
senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=319537 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding 
barriers to securing benefits through the Black Lung Benefits Program "impractical, 
harmful and absolutely unacceptable"). 
2. Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Immigration, Reforming the Immigration System: Pro-
posals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Professionalism in the Adjudi-
cation of Removal Cases 2-37 (2010) [hereinafter ABA, Reforming the Immigration 
System], available at http:/ /www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
commission_on_immigration/coi_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review); Bd. of Veterans' Appeals, Fiscal Year 2008 Report of the 
Chairman 3 (2009), available at http:/ /www.va.gov/Vetapp/ChairRpt/BVA2008AR.pdf 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also infra note 3 and accompanying text. 
3. Shinseki, 644 F.3d at 850. 
4. Id. at 887. 
5. See Immigration Backlog, Wait Times, Keep Rising, Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (july 12, 2012), http:/ /trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/286/ [hereinaf-
ter Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Backlog] (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (tracking number of cases in immigration courts awaiting resolu-
tion). In the past decade, the backlog of cases in immigration courts has increased by 
nearly two-thirds, while the average time it takes to adjudicate those cases has increased by 
nearly a third. Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts Expand, Resulting Wait Times Grow, 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (june 18, 2009), http:/ /trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/208/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
6. There are currently 260 immigration judges nationwide. About the Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
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526 days/ and producing dramatically different results for identical 
claims and parties.8 
Reformers have called for increased resources, new administrative 
law judges (ALjs), and improved attorney fee arrangements.9 But the de-
bate has otherwise ignored tools long used by civil courts to handle 
common claims raised by large groups of people: the class action and 
other complex civil litigation procedures.10 Unlike courts, virtually all 
agencies lack rules to certifY class actions or coordinate multiparty dis-
putes. Consequently, in a wide variety of cases-ranging from financial 
fraud to public benefits to petitions for asylum-agencies waste resources 
in repetitive adjudication, reach inconsistent outcomes for the same 
kinds of claims, and deny individuals access to the affordable representa-
tion that aggregate procedures promise. 11 Consider the following three 
examples: 
• In the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), wounded sol-
diers may wait for over four years just to fully adjudicate a claim 
for benefits. 12 Although thousands of disabled veterans have suf-
fered from the same system-wide violations of the VA's own pol-
icies, many claimants give up benefits, 13 while others elect to 
have a hearing at their own expense in front of a Board of 
Veterans' Appealsjudge. 14 
http:/ /wwwjustice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2012). 
7. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Backlog, supra note 5. 
8. See Ramji-Nogales et a!., Proposals for Reform, supra note 1, at 2 (describing 
lottery-like nature of outcomes in asylum cases). 
9. See, e.g., Ensuring justice in Immigration, supra note 1, at 2-8 (recommending in-
creasing resources and access to counsel and streamlining claims through prehearing 
conferences and prosecutorial discretion); Ramji-Nogales et al., Proposals for Reform, 
supra note 1, at 100-04 (recommending creation of independent Article I court to hear 
asylum claims); Eckholm, supra note 1 (describing Social Security Administration's plan to 
hire 150 new administrative appeals judges to "whittle down the backlog"); Office of 
Senator Jay Rockefeller, supra note 1 (describing proposals to review attorneys' fee ar-
rangements in Black Lung proceedings). 
10. See Stephen C. Yeazel!, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Ac-
tion 8, 10 (1987) (describing how class action suits, which allow representatives to sue on 
behalf of others with common claims, have existed for almost three centuries); cf. Admin-
istrative Procedure Act§ 2(b), 5 U.S.C. § 551 (3) (2006) (limiting definition of "party" to 
"person or agency named or admitted as a party" or affirmatively "seeking" such a role in 
same proceeding). 
11. See infra Part I (demonstrating administrative law's deficiencies with respect to its 
central goals of efficiency, consistency, accuracy, and legal access). 
12 Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated 
en bane, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012). 
13. Id. at 855. 
14. Id. at 858-59. 
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• Even though Congress created the Black Lung Benefits 
Program to provide quick relief for coal miners suffering from 
job-related lung diseases, many miners do not have the re-
sources to develop sound evidence for their black lung cases, 15 
in contrast to mine operators, who have well-financed teams of 
defense attorneys with highly trained medical experts capable of 
regularly defeating unrepresented applicants. 16 Plaintiffs attor-
neys frequently refuse miners' claims because-when adjudi-
cated individually-they take too much money and time tore-
solve.17 
• In April 2011, the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC) announced a $394 million settlement with the na-
tion's largest banks to compensate distressed homeowners hurt 
by widespread "deficient, unsafe and unsound" mortgage fore-
closure abuses. 18 Due to the sprawling nature of the abuse, vic-
tims sharply contested the settlement distribution plan. 19 Some 
sought justice from banks that wrongfully forced them out of 
their homes on the basis of sloppy, forged, or "robo-signed" 
documents.20 Others, trapped in homes worth far less than the 
15. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GA0-10-7, Black Lung Benefits Program: 
Administrative and Structural Changes Could Improve Miners' Ability to Pursue Claims 30 
(2009) [hereinafter Black Lung Benefits Program], available at http:/ /www.gao.gov/new. 
items/dl07.pdf (on file with the Columhia Law Review) (describing Department of Labor's 
inability to investigate allegations that "some doctors working for mine companies or their 
insurers conduct blood gas tests in ways that boost claimants' blood oxygen levels, thereby 
lowering their disability readings"). 
16. Id. at 27. 
17. Id. at 26-27. 
18. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Settles Civil 
Money Penalties Against Large National Bank Mortgage Servicers for $394 Million; Penalty 
Assessment Coordinated with Servicers' Actions and Payments Under Federal-State Set-
tlement (Feb. 9, 2012}, available at http:/ /www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/ 
2012/nr-occ-2012-20.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review} (describing settlements 
reached with large mortgage servicers in April 2011); see also FDIC, Regulatory Actions 
Related to Foreclosure Activities by Large Servicers and Practical Implications for Com-
munity Banks, Supervisory Insights: Special Foreclosure Edition 4 (May 2011), available at 
http:/ /www.fdic.gov I regulations/ examinations/ supervisory /insights/ sise11 I 
SI_SE201l.pdf 4 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding "widespread unsafe or 
unsound operational practices, including missing documents, execution of documents by 
unauthorized persons, failure to notarize documents in accordance with local law, inaccu-
rate affidavits, and affidavits signed by persons lacking sufficient knowledge of the underly-
ing mortgage loan transaction"). 
19. See Nelson D. Schwartz & David Streitfeld, Officials Disagree on Punishment for 
Mortgage Mess, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 2011, at B1 (describing conflict over providing reme-
dies for victims of foreclosure abuses); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosure Relief? 
Don't Hold Your Breath, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 2011, at BUl (describing other conflicts of 
interest in administration of OCC homeowner reparation plan). 
20. See Schwartz & Streitfeld, supra note 19 (noting attempts to reach settlement 
with "robo-signers processing thousands of foreclosures at a time without the required 
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value of their mortgages, sought new refinancing arrange-
ments.21 Still other public officials sought broad relief for more 
indirect victims-like troubled communities hard-hit by unsta-
ble real estate markets.22 But unlike a bankruptcy, class action, 
or other civil proceeding to distribute limited funds, the OCC 
lacked any formal rules to hear and resolve competing claims 
and interests in the mortgage foreclosure settlement. 
1997 
Had those same parties been able to aggregate their claims before 
the agency, the result would likely have been very different. Veterans 
could seek a single determination, through qualified counsel, that VA 
representatives systematically failed to offer medical treatment required 
by federallaw. 23 A single administrative judge would oversee pretrial mo-
tions for coal miners seeking funds from the same mining operator, set-
ting schedules for motion practice, managing common objections to ex-
pert testimony, and permitting plaintiffs' counsel to share discovery, at a 
lower cost.24 And after notifying interested parties, a decisionmaker 
would hear and resolve homeowners and officials' competing interests in 
the mortgage foreclosure settlement.25 
Existing tools in administrative law routinely ignore group-wide con-
cerns raised in agency adjudication. Part of the reason for this failure is 
legal safeguards"); see also Gretchen Morgenson, The Deal Is Done, but Hold the Ap-
plause, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2012, at BUl (describing attempt by Nevada's attorney gen-
eral to police terms of OCC settlement); Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, Political 
Push Moves a Deal on Mortgages Inches Closer, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2012, at B1 (describ-
ing potential settlement for victims of improper foreclosure practices). 
21. See Schwartz & Streitfeld, supra note 19 (noting "long wait to get a mortgage 
modification in which the principal or the interest rate of the loan is lowered, easing 
monthly payments" for mortgage holders whose loan principal exceeds their home's cur-
rent value). 
22. Id. (noting Obama administration's attempt "to stabilize the housing market" and 
"help bolster the economic recovery"); see also Schwartz & Dewan, supra note 20 (describ-
ing internal fights amongst state attorneys general during OCC settlement, including dis-
pute over suggested $8 billion set-aside for homeowners in California). Complaints about 
the OCC settlement lead state attorneys general from forty-nine jurisdictions to complete a 
new $25 billion settlement in 2012, overseen by court-approved monitor, joseph A. Smith. 
Brady Dennis, Bank Settlement Monitor Faces a Daunting Task, Washington Post, Apr. 19, 
2012, at Al2; Joe Nocera, Letting Banks Off the Hook, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 2011, at A25 
(complaining that OCC settlement was insufficient and undercut a more significant deal 
sought by states attorneys general). 
23. See infra Part III.B.l (proposing that similar administrative claims be aggregated 
prior to hearing). 
24. See infra Part III.B.2 (suggesting adoption of class action procedure in line with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)). 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 265-266 (recommending rules from aggregate 
litigation that call for separate attorney representation for different group interests); infra 
notes 275-279 and accompanying text (recommending rules from aggregate litigation 
that call for separate attorney representation for fairness hearings). 
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the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself,26 which, as far back as 
1946, established rules for individualized administrative hearings.27 Be-
fore the APA, agencies combined investigation, policymaking, and 
adjudication in the same department.28 As a result of a political battle 
over the implementation of New Deal programs, the APA separated the 
practice of "adjudication" from the agencies' broad policymaking pow-
ers, through the position of the ALJ. 29 Going forward, independent ALJs 
would ensure that adjudications remained insulated from undue political 
influence. Few rules existed in the APA, however, for ALJs to resolve 
cases that fell in between the formal categories of policymaking and ad-
judication-such as when agency proceedings systematically affected 
groups of people in the same way. 
Although that policy persists today, with a few notable exceptions,30 
there is no reason why ALJs should have any less power to aggregate 
26. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-559 (2006). 
27. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559) (noting APA was originally enacted in 1946). 
28. See Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 Va. 
L. Rev. 219, 219-20 (1986) (describing ABA Special Committee on Administrative Law's 
desire to transfer agency judicial power to independent tribunals); Richard E. Levy & 
Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 499, 504 (2011) (de-
scribing procedural scholars' incorporation of "emerging science of public administra-
tion" into APA). 
29. See 5 U.S.C § 7521 (a) (providing that actions to remove, suspend, or reduce pay 
of ALJs may be taken by agency employing ALJ "only for good cause"); see also George B. 
Shepard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal 
Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1680-81 (1996) ("Liberals and conservatives resolved the 
issue [of New Deal program implementation] politically by means of the partisan battles 
and negotiations that produced the APA."). 
30. Even for those existing exceptions, agencies approach class action rules in an ad 
hoc manner. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), for example, 
created an administrative class action procedure, modeled after Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to resolve "pattern and practice" claims of discrimination by fed-
eral employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204 (2012) (establishing class complaint proce-
dures). No similar procedure, however, exists for private employees. While federal law has 
authorized consolidated fair hearings in certain programs administered by the states 
where the sole issue involved is one of federal or state law or policy, no facts may be in 
dispute, each individual must be permitted to present his or her own case, and hearing 
officers cannot provide class-wide relief, thus significantly limiting the utility of consolida-
tion. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(e) (2012) (providing "consolidated hearings" for food 
stamp-related claims); 42 C.F.R. § 431.222 (2011) (providing "group hearings" for 
Medicaid-related claims); 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (5) (iv) (2011) (providing "group hearing" 
to applicants who request hearing because financial assistance was denied); see also 
Harper Jean Tobin & Rochelle Bobroff, The Continuing Viability of Medicaid Rights After 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 118 Yale LJ. Pocket Part 147, 150 (2009), http:/ I 
yalela\\journal.org/ the-yale-lawjournal-pocket-part/legislation/ the-continuing-viability-of-
medicaid-rights-after-the-deficit-reduction-act-of-2005/ (on file with the Columbia Law Re-
view) (arguing "use of consolidated group hearings ... falls far short of equaling federal 
class actions because ALJs are unable to grant class-wide relief'). Finally, a bill that called 
upon the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in the early 1990s to adopt 
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claims than a civil court. For some time, administrative law scholars have 
described the significant impact agency adjudications have on parties 
who never directly participate in a proceeding.31 Moreover, the modern 
administrative state, like the class action, originally developed in re-
sponse to intractable disputes involving large groups of people.32 The 
Supreme Court has long characterized class actions themselves as "quasi-
administrative" proceedings. 33 
This Article argues that agencies should adopt aggregation proce-
dures, like a civil class action, to resolve common claims raised by large 
groups of people in administrative courts. In such cases, designated ALJs 
would decide, just like Article III judges, whether or not common ques-
tions of law or fact exist and whether class adjudication materially ad-
vances a fair resolution more than individualized adjudication. When the 
answer is "yes," the administrative judge could coordinate common dis-
covery and prehearing motions, resolve factual or legal issues common to 
the class, and oversee any potential settlement, in a single proceeding. 
Individual class members then need only show they were part of the same 
class-and offer proof of their injury-to qualify for the relief sought. 
And even in cases that involve more individualized issues, groups could 
class actions was rejected by the agency after it received only six comments. See Futures 
Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 224, 106 Stat. 3590, 3617 (codified at 
7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2) (A)) (granting CITC power to create rule allowing for class action 
administrative procedures); Rules Relating to Reparation Proceedings, 59 Fed. Reg. 9631 
(Mar. 1, 1994) (rejecting such rule). 
31. See William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication: The Importance of Facts, and the 
Limitations of Labels, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 351, 383 (2000) (describing reasons why 
"[a]gency use of adjudication to establish a rule may well deprive subsequent defendants 
of any meaningful participation right"); Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and 
the Rule of Law, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 647, 649 (2008) (citing academic critiques of "use of 
administrative adjudication as a significant means of agency lawmaking"); David L. 
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administra-
tive Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921, 932 (1965) (arguing that many agencies exercise same 
degree of control over other people in adjudication as they would when making rules or 
regulations). 
32. See Morton]. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, at 222 
( 1992) ("Much of the struggle over administrative justice during the past century has de-
rived from [the] challenge posed by the rise of administration to nineteenth-century con-
ceptions of individually oriented justice." (footnote omitted)); Alexandra D. Lahav, The 
Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 
383, 402 (2007) [hereinafter Lahav, Numbers] (observing that Lochner-era challenges to 
administrative regulations presented "same fears expressed about the rise of administrative 
structures in the court system"). 
33. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("[F]rom the 
plaintiffs' point of view a class action resembles a 'quasi-administrative proceeding, con-
ducted by the judge.'" (quoting 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice 
'II 23.45[4-5] (1984))); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Struc-
ture of the Class Action, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 149, 185 (2003) (noting Supreme Court's 
description of class action as "quasi-administrative proceeding" (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 
809)). 
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still resolve common questions in a single proceeding before pursuing 
their unique claims. By adopting aggregate procedures, agencies may 
produce uniform outcomes more efficiently, provide more fairness for 
groups that depend upon the administrative state, and offer institutional 
advantages over aggregation in federal court. 
Of course, class action-like procedures will not solve every problem 
that now plagues the administrative state. Critics have attacked class ac-
tions for imposing similar obstacles to legal access, efficiency, and 
fairness. 34 And many cases undoubtedly involve too many individualized 
and fact-based determinations to benefit from a class action or aggregate 
treatment. Nevertheless, courts have long recognized that class actions 
remain indispensable for resolving cases that repeatedly raise the same 
issues among large groups of people.35 In the same way, the agency class 
action offers agencies another vital tool to address broad claims by those 
who depend upon the administrative state for relief. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes three contexts 
where aggregated agency adjudications could improve uniformity, effi-
ciency, and access to justice: (1) "public rights cases," which involve 
common claims between private parties and the government itself; (2) 
"private rights cases," which involve common claims between purely pri-
vate parties before the agency; and (3) "agency restitution cases," which 
involve government actions brought against private parties on behalf of 
other private parties. In the first two categories of cases, the failure to 
adopt aggregate procedures produces inconsistent judgments, spawns 
duplicative litigation, and exacerbates barriers to legal representation for 
people making common claims in agency adjudication. In the third cate-
gory, agency actions achieve the same economies of scale as a class ac-
tion, but without any of the procedural safeguards aggregate litigation 
provides to ensure fairness to parties. 
Part II explains why current tools of administrative law-including 
rulemaking, stare decisis, attorneys' fees, and federal court class ac-
tions-fail groups of people seeking the same kinds of retrospective re-
lief. Accordingly, agency class action rules will resolve many common 
34. See, e.g., Robin]. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex 
Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqba~ 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1997, 2033 (2010) (col-
lecting commentary criticizing class settlements where "plaintiffs' lawyers walk away with 
hefty fees from a favorable settlement [and] plaintiffs recoup little, if any, of the award"). 
For an example of how courts consider the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a 
proposed settlement, see Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(Friendly, J.). 
35. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (ob-
serving class actions eliminate time and expense associated with traditional one-on-one 
litigation). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The 
Effect of Class Actions, Consolidations, and Other Multiparty Devices 36 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Weinstein, Individual Justice] (noting economies of scale reduce discovery and expert 
fees). 
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disputes more effectively than these alternatives by ( 1) efficiently creat-
ing ways to pool information about recurring problems and systemic 
harms, (2) achieving greater equality in outcomes than individual adju-
dication, and (3) securing legal and expert assistance at a critical stage in 
the process.36 
Part III sets out the proposal. Federal court class actions and other 
aggregate procedures have long sought consistency, efficiency, and legal 
access.37 To that end, the recommended "agency class action" is, in fact, 
shorthand for three kinds of proceedings. Groups may petition an 
agency for an "aggregate proceeding" to (1) coordinate related factual 
allegations and discovery before a formal administrative hearing, (2) 
provide class-wide relief through an administrative proceeding, or (3) 
approve an aggregate settlement. 
However, aggregating cases also creates new risks. Accordingly, Part 
III also responds to concerns often raised by critics of the class action. In 
any aggregate litigation, the sheer number of claims may itself threaten 
legal access, efficiency, and consistency by (1) stretching administrative 
courts' capacity to administer justice to many people; (2) replacing indi-
vidual hearings with a potentially faceless, unresponsive bureaucracy; (3) 
relying upon representatives tempted by the promise of large fees or 
power; and ( 4) increasing the consequences of error in high-stakes 
cases.38 Part III thus recommends ways agencies may adopt best practices 
from aggregate litigation to make group adjudication more feasible, le-
gitimate, loyal, and accurate. 
For a long time, scholars of complex litigation have explored ways to 
import lessons from administrative law to improve procedural fairness 
and equity in collective litigation-including rules to police against con-
flicts of interest, ensure effective judicial review, and assess difficult evi-
36. See infra Part II.D-.E (explaining problems with relying on judicial review and 
federal class actions to improve uniformity, efficiency, and access in agency proceedings). 
37. See, e.g., Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 1.03 
(2010) [hereinafter ALI Report] (describing principles of aggregate litigation); Weinstein, 
Individual Justice, supra note 35, at 134-43 (discussing advantages and drawbacks of class 
actions and consolidation); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
500, 509-12 (2011) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Distributing Justice] (describing goals of 
class action settlements); AdamS. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 Duke LJ. 1105, 
1115-18 (2010) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality] (describing goals of ag-
gregate litigation). 
38. See, e.g., ALI Report, supra note 37, §§ 1.03 cmt. c, 2.02 cmt. c (observing that ag-
gregation should respect "institutional capacity of the courts," protect interests of "repre-
sented persons" as well as their "rights" delineated by law, and enable "binding resolu-
tions" as to all claimants). See generally Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance" to "Resolva-
bility": A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 995 (2005) (explor-
ing tension between common and individual questions in class actions and suggesting new 
test for class certification); Lahav, Numbers, supra note 32, at 429 (arguing "[c)ourts 
should foster a form of administration that allows access to justice, and at the same time is 
humanizing, thoughtful and deliberative"). 
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dentiary issues through sampling and randomized trials. 39 By turning the 
tables to ask what agencies can learn from complex litigation, this Article 
recommends a natural, albeit novel, kind of proceeding for those who 
depend upon the administrative state for relief. 
I. THE CRISIS IN ADMINISTRATIVE lAW 
Administrative law has long sought three overlapping goals: ( 1) effi-
cient processes and institutions; (2) consistent and accurate outcomes; 
and (3) legal access for those affected by agency decisions.4° Congress, 
for example, broadly delegates authority to administrative agencies be-
cause their expertise allows them to implement desired policies more 
efficiently and fairly.41 Administrative agencies make consistent policies 
that impact large groups through a quasi-legislative process known as 
"rulemaking," where the agency invites comments from the general pub-
lic before passing new regulations.42 Courts reviewing agency decision-
making processes have required that agencies give parties meaningful 
opportunities to be heard on actions that affect them.43 
As set forth in more detail below, when agencies fail to adopt class 
action-like procedures in adjudication, they unnecessarily undermine 
39. See Lahav, Numbers, supra note 32, at 391 (describing rise of "administrative 
structure providing non-individualized resolution for mass claims"); Richard A. Nagareda, 
Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 899, 944-52 (1996) [hereinafter 
Nagareda, Turning from Tort] (arguing courts should use framework of judicial review in 
administrative law when evaluating fairness of mass tort settlements). 
40. See Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1157, 1160 (1995) (assessing "fundamental" values 
of accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due 
Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness 
and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 772, 772-
75 (1974) (acknowledging increasing interest in accuracy, fairness, and timeliness for so-
cial welfare benefits claims); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative 
Procedure, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 258, 280 (1978) (describing criteria of fairness, efficiency, 
and satisfaction). 
41. See Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach 
Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1381, 1390-93 (2011) (explaining advantages of delay between delegation 
and agency action that enable efficient and fair decisions). 
42. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (establishing standards for rulemaking); see also 
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983) (noting "agency may rely on its rulemaking 
authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration"); United 
States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956) (acknowledging Congress's goal of 
protecting public interest with rulemaking power). 
43. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (establishing criteria 
for determining procedural safeguards in administrative adjudications for complainants 
under Due Process Clause); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (requiring pre-
termination hearing procedures for welfare benefit recipients). See generally Henry J. 
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1279-95 (1975) (discussing con-
stitutional elements of fair hearing). 
2012] AGENCY CLASS ACTION 2003 
administrative law's foundational goals of efficiency, consistency, and 
fairness. Part I.A below describes three kinds of cases likely to give rise to 
multiparty disputes. Part I.B describes how the failure to adopt aggregate 
procedures reduces agencies' capacity to efficiently process duplicative 
claims, adds to the risk of inconsistent outcomes, and compromises 
claimants' access to counsel in cases that groups could litigate more af-
fordably and effectively. 
A. Agency Adjudications Involving Multiple Parties 
Agencies routinely adjudicate three different kinds of disputes: (1) 
"public rights cases" that involve disputes or claims between private par-
ties and the government itself; (2) "private rights cases" that involve 
disputes between purely private parties before the agency; and (3) 
"agency restitution cases" that involve disputes commenced by the 
government against private parties on behalf of other private parties.44 
1. Public Rights Cases. - The most traditional form of agency adjudi-
cation involves "public rights" cases between an individual and the gov-
ernment.45 Public rights cases include a wide range of large administra-
tive screening programs, such as applications for Social Security disability 
benefits or for a change in immigration status.46 Today, the sheer num-
ber of applications overwhelms administrative judges and agency officials 
who adjudicate these cases, producing significant and recurring back-
logs. Moreover, the same questions of law and fact must be addressed in 
thousands of similar cases. Does the statute or regulation provide for the 
relief or right sought? Are disabled veterans entitled to treatment for 
44. The distinction between "private rights" and "public rights" cases made in this 
Article is slightly different from the one articulated by the Supreme Court, not always con-
sistently, in a line of cases stretching from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (de-
scribing cases of "private right" as addressing "liability of one individual to another under 
the law as defined"), to Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (explaining "what 
makes a right 'public' rather than private is that the right is integrally related to particular 
federal government action"), to police congressional delegations of judicial authority to 
agencies. For the Article's purposes, only the identities of the parties matters, not the na-
ture of the underlying claim or its relationship to a federal regulatory scheme. 
45. See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 
577--83 (2007) (tracing adjudication of public rights cases to nineteenth-century agencies 
that decided questions involving land grants, customs, and immigration); see also United 
States v.Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253,263 (1905) (indicating Congress could authorize executive 
officers to make conclusive determinations of would-be entrants' claims to United States 
citizenship); Lewis v. Lewis, 9 Mo. 183, 188 (1845) (observing Congress could rely on ad-
ministrative mechanisms to identifY land buyers because "[t]he United States is the owner 
of the public lands"). 
46. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System 332-33 (6th ed. 2009) (describing and collecting different catego-
ries of public rights cases). 
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post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at outpatient facilities?47 Does an 
ethnic minority face persecution in a country with a government that is 
unable or unwilling to stop the persecution?48 No procedures, however, 
permit parties to aggregate these common questions in agency adjudica-
tion. 
2. Private Rights Cases. - In "private rights" cases, an administrative 
judge or another tribunal adjudicates a dispute between private parties 
for allegedly violating the statute that created the agency-otherwise 
known as its "organic" or "enabling" statute-or the agency's own regula-
tions. Such cases may range from compensation for workplace injuries 
between employees and an insurance carrier,49 broker-dealer fraud in the 
futures markets, 5° or allegations of discrimination at ports of entry. 51 
Private rights cases represent a more modern phenomenon in ad-
ministrative courts. 52 Congress's increasing use of agencies to resolve pri-
vate disputes reflects a view that the process of adjudication itself supplies 
the agency with information about unfair practices within the industry 
47. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 850-52 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(finding denial of suicide prevention services for PTSD at over 800 outpatient facilities 
inconsistent with federal policy), vacated en bane, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 
John Schwartz, Instead of Helping, Trustee Program Is Hurting Veterans, Families Say, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 2011, at A16 (discussing diversion of veterans' payments to trustees 
who have taken control of such funds). 
48. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1) (2006) (requiiing that applicants for asylum face per-
secution on basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in partic-
ular social group). 
49. See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-944 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2011) (providing rights to benefits for coal miners who are disabled due to respiratory 
disease, or to surviving dependents in event of miners' deaths); Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2006) (§ 943 repealed 1965; §§ 945-
947 repealed 1984) (providing employment injury and occupational disease protection for 
workers who are injured or contract occupational diseases on navigable waters of United 
States). 
50. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834 (1986) (recog-
nizing right ofCFTC to hear claims and counterclaims in futures trading disputes). 
51. See 46 C.F.R. § 502.142 (2001) (listing types of cases in which Federal Maritime 
Commission shall conduct formal hearings pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2002)); Fed. Mar. 
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 764 (2002) (describing powers of Federal 
Maritime Commission to adjudicate disputes of discrimination between private parties). 
52. See Nelson, supra note 45, at 563-64 ("[S]cholars and the modem Supreme 
Court are well aware of nineteenth-century precedents allowing legislatures or their dele-
gates in the executive branch to adjudicate 'public rights,' but insisting that only entities 
with judicial power can authoritatively declare the loss of an individual's core 'private 
rights' to life, liberty, or property."); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-70 (1982) (observing Framers' view "that Congress would be free 
to commit [the adjudication of public rights] completely to nonjudicial executive deter-
mination," but not private rights); John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. LJ. 2513, 2516 (1998) (describing "exercise of congres-
sional substantive power to establish nonjudicial finality in administrative adjudications 
and to create causes of action"). 
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that it regulates.53 Accordingly, since the 1980s, and as early as the 1930s, 
the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that agencies may adjudicate purely 
private disputes between parties as part of their regulatory mission.54 
Like public rights cases, many private rights cases involve the same 
questions oflaw or fact. Among other things, private disputes may involve 
the same pattern and practice of discrimination, scientific questions of 
causation and exposure, or common questions of liability.55 In such 
cases, agencies must repeatedly decide questions about the same futures 
trader, the same patterns in hiring or promotion, or the same workplace 
exposure to asbestos or other dangers. 
3. Agency Restitution Cases. - Finally, agencies will commence actions 
on behalf of large groups of people against a private party in "restitution 
cases."56 Over the past decade, agencies collected over $10 billion from 
regulatory violators to compensate people hurt by massive frauds, rang-
ing from the national foreclosure crisis,57 to false advertising,58 to defec-
53. See, e.g., Verity Winship, Public Agencies and Investor Compensation: Examples 
from the SEC and CITC, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 137, 152-61 (2009) (describing "informa-
tional advantages" in CFTC reparation proceedings, including factual information about 
industry practices and agency's view of relevant law). 
54. See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 847, 857 (concluding Commodity Exchange Act em-
powers CFTC to entertain state law counterclaims in reparations proceedings without 
violating Article III); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: 
From Murray s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 Buff. L. Rev. 765, 767 ( 1986) (describing 
development of exceptions to constitutional requirement that federal judicial cases be 
tried by equal and independent federal judicial branch of government). But see Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (rejecting counterclaim in Article I courts, but reaf-
firming that "it is still the case that what makes a right 'public' rather than private is that 
the right is integrally related to particular federal government action"). 
55. See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GA0-08-628T, Federal Compensation 
Programs: Perspectives on Four Programs for Individuals Injured by Exposure to Harmful 
Substances 8 (2008) (obsernng factors delaying difficult medical claims for disability or 
death in Black Lung Program, Radiation Exposure Compensation Program (RECP), and 
Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program (EEOICP) included 
common statutory and regulatory eligibility requirements); Press Release, Am. Fed'n of 
Gov't Emps., Union Decries Retaliatory Tactics, Discrimination in Federal Prisons (July 13, 
2011), available at http:/ /www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaseiD= 
1299 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (alleging systematic pattern and practice of 
retaliatory discrimination against employees of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) before EEOC, 
but arguing there was "no process in place for the agency to effectively monitor" BOP 
discrimination). 
56. See Zimmerman, DistributingJustice, supra note 37, at 527-39 (describing trends 
in federal agencies such as SEC, FTC, and FDA). The SEC sought to distribute $10.7 bil-
lion between 2007 and 2011, including $2.8 billion in 2011 alone. SEC, Putting Investors 
First: 2011 Performance and Accountability Report 66 (2011), available at http:/ /www.sec. 
gov/about/secpar/secpar201l.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
57. See Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide To Distribute Settlement to Its Clients, 
N.Y. Times, July 21, 2011, at B1 (describing unprecedented settlement struck between 
Federal Trade Commission and Countrywide Home Loan for excessive fees during mort-
gage crisis); Press Release, FTC, FTC Urges Consumers to Cash Restitution Checks Mailed 
2006 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1992 
tive drugs.59 Today, the SEC regularly assesses monetary awards against 
large public companies and distributes the proceeds to injured inves-
tors.60 When the Federal Trade Commission assesses civil awards for false 
advertising, it often distributes the award to injured consumers.61 Even 
the Postal Service sanctions scam artists who commit mail fraud and dis-
tributes their ill-gotten gains to potential victims.62 
In such cases, agencies already achieve some of the same economies 
of scale as a class action by aggregating individual distributions through a 
single enforcement proceeding. However, restitution cases fail to include 
aggregation procedures to ensure that victims participate in their own 
by Wachovia Bank Qan. 13, 2009) [hereinafter FTC, Restitution Checks], available at 
http:/ /www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/01/wachovia.shtm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing $150 million fund established by FTC and Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency settlement with Wachovia Bank for victims of telemarketing fraud); Press Re-
lease, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to 
Subprime Mortgage CDO Quly 15, 2010), available at http:/ /sec.gov/news/press/2010/ 
2010-123.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Goldman Sachs settle-
ment details). 
58. See FTC, Restitution Checks, supra note 57 (noting $150 million in restitution 
checks were given to "more than 740,000 consumers who were victims of [Wachovia 
Bank's] telemarketing fraud"). 
59. See Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction at 23-24, United States v. Schering-
Piough Corp., No. 02-2397 (D.NJ. May 20, 2002), available at http:/ /www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/ AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/UCM095945.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (specifying company's agreement to pay U.S. Treasury $500 million in defec-
tive drug case). 
60. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006) (requiring civil penalties 
be added to disgorgement funds for benefit of victims of securities laws violations); see 
also Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 
Bus. Law. 317, 318 (2008) (describing Fair Fund provision and SEC's new role in investor 
compensation); Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured Inves-
tors, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 1103, 1110-14, 1118-23 (2008) ("The SEC ha[s] two main mecha-
nisms for compensating injured investors: distribution of disgorged funds and ... distribu-
tion of money penalties pursuant to the Fair Fund provision."); Zimmerman, Distributing 
Justice, supra note 37, at 527-33 (describing SEC authorization to distribute civil penalties 
to injured investors). 
61. See FTC v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36--37 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding 
that FTC is able to "pursue monetary relief' in civil actions); Stipulated Final Judgment 
and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief as to Defendants 
Lifelock and Davis, FTC v. LifeLock, 2:10-cv-00530-MHM (D. Ariz. Mar. 15, 2010) (stipu-
lated final judgment and order awarding $11 million to consumers), available at http:/ I 
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723069/index.shtrn (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For 
criticism of the development of this distribution process, see Peter C. Ward, Restitution for 
Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good Intentions or Congressional 
Intentions, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 1139, 1197 (1992) (arguing such distribution should not be 
allowed absent explicit congressional approval). 
62. The United States Postal Inspection Service enforces approximately 200 federal 
statutes in an effort to protect the mail system. It seeks restitution primarily in mail fraud 
investigations, mail theft, and various other crimes in which the Postal Service is financially 
impacted. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (outlawing mail fraud); id. § 1708 (outlawing 
mail theft). 
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redress, to police conflicts of interest, or to compensate parties efficiently 
and consistently with their own injuries, like the case of the Mortgage 
Foreclosure Settlement discussed above.63 Despite the increasingly high-
profile nature of large settlements forged by agencies, they otherwise lack 
aggregate procedures to compensate victims with the limited funds col-
lected from regulatory wrongdoers. 
B. Agency Adjudications Lack Consistency, Efficiency, and Fairness 
Public rights, private rights, and agency restitution cases strain the 
ability of agencies to achieve consistency, efficiency, and access to justice 
in the adjudication of commonly alleged harm. This section addresses 
each goal, and how agency adjudication falls short, in turn. 
1. Consistency. - Public rights caseloads present the greatest chal-
lenge to the idea of "equal justice under law."64 Advocates and academics 
describe notoriously wide disparities in the ways that different adminis-
trative judges resolve similar cases. Recent studies of asylum applications, 
for example, found extreme differences in grant rates at all levels of the 
immigration system, even when controlling for the applicant's country of 
origin.65 In one regional asylum office, immigration officers were worlds 
apart, "with some officers granting asylum to no Chinese nationals, while 
others granted asylum in as many as 68% of their cases."66 In a Miami 
immigration court, Colombian asylum applicants had a 5% chance of 
63. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (describing $394 million mortgage 
foreclosure settlement in which victims contested settlement distribution plan but OCC 
lacked rules to hear and resolve competing claims and interests); see also 17 C.F.R. § 
201.1106 (2011) ("[N]o person shall be granted leave to intervene or to participate or 
otherwise to appear in any agency proceeding or otherwise to challenge [a distribution 
plan, eligibility determination, or disbursement]."); Official Comm. of Unsecured Credi-
tors ofWorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 82-84 (2d Cir. 2006) (limiting judicial review 
of distribution plans approved by SEC). 
64. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1785, 1785-86 
(2001) (observing that "'[e]qual justice under law' is one of America's most firmly em-
bedded and widely violated legal principles"); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Changing Equali-
ties, 54 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 42I, 426 (2010) ("We have still a long way to go to provide true 
equality in the courthouse."); Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to the 
Courts, 13 Conn. L. Rev. 651, 655 (1981) ("[E]quality of access is in the real world little 
more than a figment of the jurisprudential imagination."). 
65. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholdtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Rou-
lette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295, 301 (2007) [hereinafter 
Ramji-Nogales eta!., Refugee Roulette] (finding large variation in grant rates among simi-
lar asylum law cases); see also U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GA0-08-940, U.S. Asylum 
System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes Across Immigration Courts and 
Judges 62 (2008), available at http:/ /www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (listing recommendations to address potentially unwarranted dispar-
ities in asylum outcomes among judges); ABA, Reforming the Immigration System, supra 
note 2, at 1-12 to -14 (citing Department of Homeland Security data on asylum ca~es). 
66. Ramji-Nogales eta!., Refugee Roulette, supra note 65, at 296. 
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prevailing with one of the court's judges and an 88% chance of prevail-
ing with another judge in the same building.67 According to the same 
report, half of the Miami judges deviated by "more than 50% from the 
court's mean grant rate" for all Colombian cases.68 Asylum outcomes also 
heavily correlated with factors totally unrelated to the merits of the appli-
cant's claim, including whether the asylum seeker was represented, the 
number of dependents of the applicant, the judge's gender, and the 
judge's prior work experience.69 In some cases, judges in the same court-
house, evaluating claimants with the same country conditions, were 
1,820% more likely to grant asylum than another judge in the same 
building. 70 
Even cases that come down to individual credibility determinations 
may still raise common legal or factual questions. In many asylum claims, 
for example, an adjudicator must assess the applicant's account of his or 
her experience in the applicant's native country or whether the applicant 
has a well-founded fear of persecution if forced to return-an inquiry 
that is impossible to resolve in the aggregate.71 Nevertheless, multiple 
applicants also routinely raise common questions of law and fact that can 
be effectively resolved as a group-like whether an identifiable minority 
group suffers persecution and whether the government actively encour-
ages persecution.72 Even though such questions arise across large classes 
of applicants, no procedure currently allows agencies to resolve them 
consistently in adjudication. 
In private rights cases, an agency's individual adjudication of com-
mon legal or factual claims also risks inconsistent outcomes, particularly 
when plaintiffs lack access to common resources or expert information. 
For example, coal miners seeking compensation from mining companies 
face very different outcomes in the Black Lung Benefits Program. 73 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 339-49. 
70. Ramji-Nogales et al., Proposals for Reform, supra note 1, at 40-44 (tracing differ-
ences in New York immigration judges' grant rates for Albanian applicants). 
71. I d. at 11 ("Asylum decisions ... involve both a judgment about whether the appli-
cant's story, if true, would render the applicant eligible for asylum under American law 
and ... whether the applicant is telling the truth .... "). 
72. See Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (discuss-
ing differences between race and ethnicity in "grounds of persecution" analysis); 
Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing Board oflmmigration 
Appeals (BIA) denial of asylum for Ukrainian Jews based upon beatings and disappear-
ance of other Jews in Kiev); M.A. v. U.S. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 322 (4th Cir. 1990) (observing 
petitioner entitled to asylum when "objective evidence that he or members of his group, 
which includes those with the same political beliefs of the petitioner, have been, or \Ifill be, 
subjected to persecution"). 
73. See Black Lung Benefits Program, supra note 15, at 26-27 (discussing disincen-
tives for lawyers to take on black lung cases). 
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Although the Black Lung Benefits Program approves over $250 million 
in benefits each year, many complain that the program results in incon-
sistent outcomes, particularly with average claim approval rates "histori-
cally below 15 percent and with reports of some cases that take years to 
resolve."74 Among other things, a 2009 Government Accountability Office 
report found that many benefit determinations often hinged on dispar-
ate access to counsel and experts, as well as different adjudicators' views 
about whether classes of miners were eligible for common forms of lung 
disease.75 
Like asylum cases, private rights claims alleging exposure to work-
place hazards, damages from fraud, or individual discrimination, will also 
turn on individual, fact-based determinations. Agencies, however, risk 
inconsistent access and outcomes by failing to coordinate discovery 
against the same parties or resolve common factual or legal problems. 
Among other things, different adjudicators may repeatedly consider 
whether claimants may or may not recover for the same kind of disease/6 
whether the same employer exposed workers to the same pattern of dis-
crimination, 77 or whether a broker engaged in the same pattern of fraud-
ulent conduct with investors.78 
Even agency-restitution cases-which already involve a government-
sponsored aggregate action against a third party-risk inconsistent out-
comes when agencies do not use aggregation procedures to hear from 
different classes of victims. In a settlement to resolve allegations that the 
software giant Computer Associates improperly inflated its financial 
statements, for example, the SEC appointed Kenneth Feinberg as a spe-
cial master to distribute hundreds of millions to many kinds of victims. 79 
74. Id. at 1; see also Brian L. Hager, Is There Light at the End of the Tunnel? Balanc-
ing Finality and Accuracy for Federal Black Lung Benefits Awards, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1561, 1563 (2003) ("The major factors contributing to the marathon-like benefits process 
include the imbalance in legal resources between coal miners and coal operators and the 
mountains of medical evidence presented by each party .... "). 
75. See Black Lung Benefits Program, supra note 15, at 22 (noting weight of creden-
tials of physician and comprehensiveness of evidence in determining cause of claimant's 
disability). 
76. See, e.g., id. at 21 (noting how ALJs repeatedly consider appropriate nonclinical 
factors to establish whether pneumoconiosis is attributable to inhalation of coal dust or 
tobacco smoking). 
77. See, e.g., Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 852 F.2d 1008, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 
1988) (involving thirty-nine employees who filed EEOC complaints alleging age discrimi-
nation prior to bringing class action in federal court). 
78. See, e.g., Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. 571 F.3d 672, 674, 680 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(Posner, J.) (finding class certification appropriate in action against investment firm ac-
cused of manipulating Treasury note futures market in violation of Commodity Exchange 
Act). 
79. Gretchen Morgenson, Giving Away Lots of Money Is Easy, Right?, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 13, 2005, at BUI [hereinafter Morgenson, Money] (discussing difficulty of computa-
tion of damages for fund dispersal); Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Securities Fraud 
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Among other things, Special Master Feinberg had to consider who would 
be eligible to recover from the fund. Some were ineligible to recover in 
the civil system because their claims were time-barred. Feinberg, how-
ever, chose to allow parties with time-barred claims to recover from the 
restitution fund. 80 Moreover, payments in civil litigation ordinarily reflect 
the litigation costs and risks associated with different categories of 
claims.81 However, Feinberg chose to ignore these factors in his distribu-
tion plan.82 No rules existed then-or now-to permit the agency to 
"sub-class" parties so that varying interests are represented by separate 
trustees, class representatives, or counsel.83 The SEC's failure to address 
how victims should participate in the formation of such a plan compro-
mises its ability to ensure that like victims are treated in a like manner. 
2. Efficiency. - The absence of aggregation procedures also aggra-
vates inefficiencies in adjudication-wasting resources in duplicative liti-
gation, requiring frequent remands to address common factual errors, 
and hampering the efficient development and enforcement of law. In 
public rights cases, agencies exhaust precious resources by relitigating 
common questions that arise in applications for government relief or 
benefits. The Veterans Administration may require defrauded soldiers to 
file separate petitions to remove the same trustee that wrongfully han-
dled or embezzled their assets.84 The Department of Homeland Security 
Charges Against Computer Associates International, Inc., Former CEO Sanjay Kumar, and 
Two Other Former Company Executives (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http:/ /www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2004-134.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Reuiw). 
80. Just as in civil litigation, however, the Special Master denied claims by those who 
only held Computer Associates stock. Putting aside the fact only buyers and sellers are 
ordinarily entitled to recover in a securities case, the Special Master also cited the difficult 
valuation questions raised by such claims. See Plan of Allocation for the Restitution Fund 
at 2 n.2, United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., No. 04-837 (E.D.N.Y.June 28, 2005), 
available at http:/ /www.computerassociatesrestitutionfund.com/pdf/ carfl plan.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Reuiw) (describing disputed claims by holders, purchasers, and 
sellers of defendant's stock). 
81. See, e.g., ALI Report, supra note 37, § 1.04 cmt. f (observing that in conventional 
and aggregate litigation settlement values reflect "risk aversion, the ability to endure delay, 
and other arbitrary factors"); Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 21.62 (2004) (es-
tablishing criteria for evaluating a proposed settlement). 
82. Plan of Allocation for the Restitution Fund, supra note 80, at 4-5 (" [T] he for-
mula proposed here does not discount or weight claims based on litigation risk .... "). 
The Special Master's decision was well-grounded. While courts usually consider such fac-
tors in civil class action settlements, regulatory victims, unlike plaintiffs, do not face the 
same costs and litigation risks when agencies commence actions against defendants. How-
ever, agencies still risk inconsistency without some standards for those faced with similar 
distribution questions in future cases. 
83 Compare id., with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (5) (allowing subclasses in class actions), 
and 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006) (imposing subclassing and voting requirements in 
bankruptcy reorganizations involving asbestos liability). 
84. See Schwartz, supra note 47 (noting government generally responds to suits by 
stating decision to appoint a fiduciary is under jurisdiction of VA). 
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may require hundreds of asylum applicants to prove, in separate pro-
ceedings, that the same country persecutes the same ethnic minority.85 
Multiple disabled students may commence separate proceedings before a 
local educational agency to challenge the same state- or city-wide policy 
that violates their rights to remain in school under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act.86 
The absence of aggregation techniques also creates inefficient fact-
finding, as appeals courts frequently remand cases to cure common er-
rors or weaknesses in the record. For example, a federal district court 
recently found that the Board of Veterans' Appeals only affirmed 40% of 
the decisions made by "trial level" hearing officers.87 Almost half of those 
cases were "avoidable remands" based on common errors and violations 
that protracted benefit decisions by another 500 days each.88 Similar re-
mand rates and delays also persist in Social Security and immigration 
hearings. 89 
Finally, without tools to handle the sheer volume of claims, agencies 
fail to efficiently develop settled expectations about the law or their own 
regulations.90 The shortage of immigration judges to process repeated 
issues in immigration courts, for example, has forced immigration judges 
85. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (highlighting different treatment 
by different courts of same ethnic minorities). 
86. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004 §615, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 
(2006) (establishing procedures for parents of child with disability to bring complaint 
under IDEA); N.D. v. Haw. Dep't ofEduc., 469 F. App'x 570,571 (9th Cir. 2012) (describ-
ing how parents of children with disabilities requested individual due process hearings 
from Hawaii Department of Education regarding potential changes in educational place-
ments due to system-wide furlough program); D.S. ex rei. S.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't ofEduc., 255 
F.R.D. 59, 74-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting individuals with claims under Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act can opt out of class action lawsuits (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23) ). 
87. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 860 (9th Cir. 2011), va-
cated en bane, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012). 
88. Id. 
89. See, e.g., ABA, Reforming the Immigration System, supra note 2, at 3-24 to -25 
(describing "withering criticism from some circuit court panels" and reversal rates that in 
some cases exceed 40%, but finding reversal rates "consistent" with "federal administrative 
action generally"); Eckholm, supra note 1 (observing that "of the more than 575,000 who 
go on to file appeals-putting them in the vast line for a hearing before a special federal 
judge-two-thirds eventually win a reversal"). 
90. Commentators and courts have long acknowledged that class actions generate im-
portant spillover effects that make the interpretation and enforcement of law more effi-
cient. See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding class 
action waiver would enable unchecked, unlawful market behavior); Kristian v. Comcast 
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing that if class action ban were enforced, 
"the social goals of ... antitrust laws [would] ... be frustrated because of the 'enforce-
ment gap' created by the de facto liability shield"); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable 
Litigation? A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. 
Rev. 709, 710 (2006) (arguing that class actions produce beneficial "spillover effects" not 
present in individual claims). 
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to rely upon oral decisions made immediately at the close of the hearing 
"without sufficient time to conduct legal research or thoroughly analyze 
the issues and evidence."91 Current practice stunts the development of 
law as noncitizens, their counsel, and appellate courts struggle to under-
stand the basis of separate, hurried, unwritten decisions in cases that fre-
quently raise common legal questions.92 
The absence of aggregation procedures creates similar inefficiencies 
in "private rights" cases. Appellate bodies in the Black Lung Benefits 
Program, such as the Veterans Administration, frequently remand cases 
in which mining operators challenge coal miners' benefits.93 Many ad-
ministrative judges blame remands on the limited availability of compe-
tent experts and the frequency with which experts misdiagnose of min-
ers' medical conditions or make mistakes as to whether those conditions 
originate from the same workplace.94 In other cases, the failure to aggre-
gate cases hampers enforcement efforts. Following a racketeering 
scheme targeting two of the largest futures markets in the country, or-
ganizations petitioned Congress to permit class actions against future 
speculators in Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) pro-
ceedings.95 Advocates championed the measure as a "Farmers' Bill of 
Rights" to stamp out widespread scams that hurt farmers in futures mar-
kets but that were otherwise too difficult and costly to litigate individu-
ally.96 Congress approved the measure, yet the CFTC abandoned the 
91. Ensuring Justice in Immigration, supra note I, at 4; see also ABA, Reforming the 
Immigration System, supra note 2, at 3-13 to -15 (arguing unreasoned immigration deci-
sions by Board of Immigration Officials have negative impact for Board, reviewing court, 
and noncitizens). 
92. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Prob-
lem, 23 Geo. Immigr. LJ. 595, 604-05 (2009) (finding "[s]erious problems" now "beset 
adjudication before the Board of Immigration Appeals" as a result of modified BIA proce-
dures); Shruti Rana, "Streamlining" the Rule of Law: How the Department of Justice Is 
Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829, 831-39, 846-49 
(arguing written, reasoned decisions "provide assurance ... that the arguments raised 
were heard and considered, and facilitate further review by revealing and clarifying the 
reasoning behind the decisions"). 
93. See Black Lung Benefits Program, supra note 15, at 15 (reporting that "[i]n addi-
tion to the significant number of claims that are appealed, many are remanded back to the 
prior review stage by [Department of Labor (DOL)] adjudicators"). 
94. Id. at 16 ("Some administrative law judges said claims are sometimes remanded to 
[Office of Workers Compensation Program] because medical evidence submitted by 
DOL's approved doctors was incomplete and required clarification or further develop-
ment."). 
95. S. Rep. No. 102-22, at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3103, 3104 (not-
ing case for more stringent regulation arose after 1989 law enforcement sting operation 
against traders at nation's two largest futures exchanges). 
96. ld. at 21, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3123 (summarizing testimony from 
members of Farmers' Union and National Cattlemen's Association). Advocates raise simi-
lar concerns about the veterans' benefit system. See S. Rep. No. 111-265, at 35 (2009) 
(statement of Professor Michael P. Allen) ("[O]ne cannot avoid concluding that the 
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proposal after receiving complaints from banks and other traders on the 
futures market.97 
Agency-restitution cases raise slightly different efficiency concerns. 
When an agency collects restitution for a large group of people, the 
agency actually achieves many of the same efficiencies as a class action, 
and arguably more efficiency for the victim than if the claim were 
brought on its own.98 By denying group-based participation in such settle-
ments, however, agencies risk other inefficiencies, including expensive 
forms of outreach for victims who are never included in the settlement 
process.99 
For example, in the highly touted multimillion dollar settlement be-
tween former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, the SEC, and the 
nation's largest investment banks, the banks agreed to establish a $400 
million settlement fund to pay injured investors. 100 The proposed settle-
ment, however, failed to offer any framework for "formulating and im-
plementing a distribution plan." 101 When the court invited the SEC to 
define the components of the distribution plan, no victims participated. 
Indeed, while the SEC "professed its interest in restitution," it never iden-
tified relevant securities and potential claims of injured investors.102 Over 
the six years that the SEC administered the Fair Fund, 103 the cost of the 
absence of such authority to address multiple cases at once has an effect on system-wide 
timeliness of adjudication."). Nevertheless, the Court of Veterans Appeals has held that it 
lacks power to hear aggregate litigation concerning more generic issues that may affect 
groups of veterans. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439, 440 (1991) (per cu-
riam) (rejecting contention that court had authority to adjudicate class actions). 
97. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 224, 106 Stat. 
3590, 3617 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2) (A)) (authorizing CFTC to issue rule permit-
ting class actions); Rules Relating to Reparation Proceedings, 59 Fed. Reg. 9631 (Mar. 1, 
1994) (declining to adopt Class Action Proposal). 
98. See AdamS. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1385, 1411-14 (2011) (comparing efficiencies of class actions and large criminal 
restitution funds brokered by prosecutors and agencies); Zimmerman, Distributing Jus-
tice, supra note 37, at 540 (observing class action and agency restitution settlements share 
similar economies of scale). 
99. See Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 37, at 549 ("When agencies 
limit victim participation in a settlement, they risk compromising their own goals of ac-
countability, efficiency, and equity."). 
100. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing 
settlement agreement in detail). For an in-depth accounting of the circumstances 
surrounding the settlement agreement, see Barbara Moses, They Were Shocked, Shocked: 
The "Discovery" of Analyst Conflicts on Wall Street, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 89, 100-02 (2004). 
101. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d at 404. 
102. ld. at 411. The investment banks and the SEC were more than capable of doing 
so since "each had trade data permitting [it] to analyze the number of shares purchased or 
sold for any security through any given investment bank and the relevant market prices for 
any time period." Id. 
103. Black, supra note 60, at 318-19 (2008) (describing Fair Fund provision of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, which gives SEC greater power to compensate investors (citing Sarbanes-
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Fund-including efforts to locate and notify claimants-climbed to over 
$10 million, and over $79 million remained undistributed. 104 In the end, 
the court was left with no choice but to return the remaining funds to 
the U.S. Treasury.105 By failing to adopt aggregate settlement procedures 
that account for victims' interests in restitution cases, agencies miss an 
important opportunity to efficiently calculate damages, identify and uni-
formly compensate different interests, and, ultimately, force wrongdoers 
to accurately account for the harm they cause. 
3. Access to Justice. - Finally, the failure to permit class-wide relief 
compromises access to competent counsel and to a 'just, speedy, and in-
expensive" resolution.106 Parties in public rights and private rights cases 
may lack access to affordable counsel because of collective action prob-
lems. That is, even when a defendant causes a great deal of harm to a 
large group of people, those cases may be too expensive to litigate sepa-
rately. 107 Also, for those parties that can afford counsel, delays and repeat 
litigation costs mean that they may never receive a hearing before an ad-
judicator. 108 
Many applicants for government benefits, for example, cannot af-
ford to hire a lawyer.109 Lawyers representing individuals in administra-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7246))). 
104. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d at 410-12 (stating first phase of Fund cost 
$9.3 million and second phase cost $3.8 million, with $79 million remaining unclaimed). 
105. Id. at 420 (ordering undistributed funds minus additional remedial payments, 
costs, and fees be returned to Treasury). 
106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules ... should be construed and administered to se-
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."). 
107. Cf. Black Lung Benefits Program, supra note 15, at 26 (noting lack of financial 
incentives for lawyers to take black lung claimants' cases due to time and cost of pursuing 
such claims). 
108. It takes an average of nearly four years for a veteran who disputes a decision of 
the Veterans' Administration to receive a final judgment by the Board of Veterans' 
Appeals. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) 
("[T]he district court found that it takes on average 1,419 days (3.9 years) from the vet-
eran's initial filing of the [appeal] to the veteran's receiving a decision from the Board [of 
Veterans' Appeals]."), vacated en bane, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012). During one six-
month period from 2007 to 2008, 1,467 veterans died while their appeals were pending. 
Id. at 860. On the tragic problem of delay in the processing of claims for veterans' bene-
fits, see James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The Problem 
of Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by Federal Agen-
cies, 64 Admin. L. Rev. 57, 65-68 (2011) ("[S]truggles ... are the norm for ... agencies 
rather than the exception."). 
109. Cal. Comm'n on Access to Justice, Action Plan for Justice 32 (2007), available at 
http:/ I cc.calbar.ca.gov /LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=6TCtvZ3Ei4k%3D&tabid=1195 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing ratio of one lawyer for every 8,360 California 
legal aid clients); Task Force on Access to Civil Justice et al., Am. Bar Ass'n, Report to the 
House of Delegates 5 (2006), available at http:/ /www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
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tive adjudications must rely on billable fees or fees for services rather 
than contingency fees. 110 Some indigent applicants for benefits may ob-
tain counsel through legal aid or civil legal services.111 However, non-
profit organizations continue to face budget cuts and shortfalls, and legal 
services cannot represent all of the individuals in adjudicatory proceed-
ings.112 Only 40% of detained immigrants have lawyers; more than a 
quarter of immigration defendants who have not been detained also do 
not have lawyers. 113 In private rights cases, like those involving the Black 
Lung Benefits Program, few financial incentives exist for lawyers to take 
black lung claimants' cases or to cover the costs associated with develop-
ing evidence needed to support miners' claims.ll4 
Yet inadequate access to counsel continues to adversely affect the 
outcomes of many public benefit and private rights cases. Asylum seekers 
with legal representation, for example, are granted asylum at a rate of 
45.6%, while those without counsel are successful only 16.3% of the 
time.115 Mine operators, who, unlike their employees, retain counsel and 
aba/ directories/ policy /2006_am_ll2a. pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (collect-
ing studies showing that up to 90% of civil legal assistance needs go unmet). 
110. In some cases, however, attorneys may be able to recoup attorneys' fees from the 
government if they are successful. See infra Part ll.C (discussing statutory attorneys' fees). 
111. The Legal Aid Society, for example, represents low-income families and indi-
viduals (defined as having an annual income at or below 125% of the federal poverty 
level) in legal matters involving housing, benefits, disability, domestic violence, family 
issues, health, employment, immigration, HIV I AIDS, prisoners' rights, and elder law. 
Frequently Asked Questions About the Legal Aid Society, Legal Aid Soc'y, http:/ I 
www.legal-aid.org/en/las/aboutus/legalaidsocietyfaq.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (last visited Oct.. 9, 2012) (describing accepted clientele of Legal Aid Society). 
112. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 
Stan. L. Rev. 2027, 2042 (2008) ("Direct service providers and human rights organizations 
face the most obvious and painful reminders of the overwhelming demand and limited 
capacity to meet it."); Diane Curtis, Economic Downturn Puts a Crimp in Legal Services, 
Cal. BJ., Feb. 2009, at AI, available at http:/ /archive.calbar.ca.gov/ Archive.aspx?articleid 
=95083&categoryid=95001&month=2&year=2009 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing cuts of over half for some California legal aid offices); Economic Woes 
Threaten Legal Aid Nationwide, Reading Eagle (Pa.), Dec. 8, 2008, at A7, available at 
http:/ I news.google .com/ newspapers?id=EZEjAAAAIBAJ &sjid=u6IF AAAAIBAJ&pg=3888 
%2C5274820 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting expected drops of up to 
50% in earmarks for legal services for poor in some jurisdictions). 
113. Sam Dolnick, Improving Immigrant Access to Lawyers: Advocates Gather to Dis-
cuss a 'Substantial Threat' to Justice, N.Y. Times, May 4, 2011, at A24 (discussing problems 
with immigrants obtaining legal representation). 
114. See Black Lung Benefits Program, supra note 15, at 26-27 (noting low rate of 
success and high litigation costs contribute to difficulties miners face in obtaining legal 
representation). 
115. Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette, supra note 65, at 340; see also Steering 
Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing]ustice: The Availa-
bility and Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 363 
(2011) (describing representation as one of most important variables in obtaining success-
ful outcome in immigration case). 
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well-credentialed experts, appeal decisions over five times more often than 
coal miners. 116 This should not be surprising. Lawyers speak the language 
of the court and are familiar with the burdens that the applicant must 
meet and how to carry those burdens. They are also more likely to find 
corroborating evidence and experts to testify about country conditions or 
their client's mental and physical health.117 
Finally, agency-restitution cases compromise legal access because 
they lack procedures to ensure aggrieved parties participate in the pro-
ceeding or to resolve conflicts of interest in the award. As part of its set-
tlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Computer Asso-
ciates agreed to establish a $225 million restitution fund to compensate 
shareholders injured by the scandal. 118 Months after the fund was an-
nounced, however, not a single shareholder had proposed how to dis-
pense the money in a fair and appropriate manner. 119 
II. EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE TOOLS INADEQUATELY RESOLVE GROUP 
CLAIMS 
Although agencies possess some tools to improve uniformity, effi-
ciency, and access for groups of people, none is as effective as aggregate 
adjudication. Agencies currently use rulemaking and stare decisis to en-
hance efficiency and consistency in individual adjudications. Statutory 
attorneys' fees provisions improve parties' access to legal representation. 
When judges review agency decisions and procedures, they also encour-
age agencies to decide different cases involving similar questions consist-
ently. Finally, quality control measures and informal aggregation tech-
niques may discourage inconsistency and improve efficient case han-
dling. As set forth below, however, all of these tools fail to serve the 
broader remedial purpose of class actions and procedural aggregation: to 
remedy systemic violations of rights that otherwise leave groups of claim-
ants without any effective redress in individualized hearings. 
116. Black Lung Benefits Program, supra note 15, at 15. 
117. See Ramji-Nogales et a!., Refugee Roulette, supra note 65, at 340-41 (confirm-
ing representation is single most important factor affecting outcome of asylum seeker's 
case and noting that "[a]sylum seekers whose legal representatives track down corroborat-
ing evidence and obtain experts to testifY about country conditions as well as about the 
asylum seeker's mental and physical health are more likely to win"). 
118. See Plan of Allocation for the Restitution Fund, supra note 80, at I (describing 
setup of restitution fund to compensate current and former shareholders). 
119. Morgenson, Money, supra note 79. 
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A. Rulemaking 
Most agencies make rules to "resolve certain issues of general ap-
plicability"120 and ensure that adjudicators implement agency policy effi-
ciently and consistently. 121 This is particularly helpful for agencies that 
must repeatedly address the same questions of law or fact in large num-
bers of public rights cases, like claims for benefits, immigration and nat-
uralization proceedings, and applications for government licenses. Theo-
retically, rulemaking can resolve common issues uniformly, while reliev-
ing ALJs of the burden of repeatedly addressing the same issues in indi-
vidual cases. 122 Indeed, since the 1970s, informal rulemaking has been 
the preferred means of implementing agency policy, instead of individu-
alized agency adjudications.123 Administrative law scholars have generally 
approved the trend, finding rulemaking to be (1) more effective at ex-
ploring questions of policy, law, and legislative fact; (2) more transparent 
to the general public; and (3) fairer to the parties affected by the 
agency's decisions. 124 
Nevertheless, rulemaking has its limits as a tool for addressing in-
consistency, inefficiency, and accessibility for groups of people alleging 
the same kind of harm. First, the law generally disfavors retroactive rule-
making.125 Retroactive rules unfairly surprise parties and undermine 
120. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991). See generally M. Elizabeth 
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 1386--90 (2004) 
(describing range of policymaking tools generally available to agencies). 
121. See jerry L. Mashaw et al., Administrative Law: The American Public Law System 
455 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Mashaw eta!., Administrative Law] (noting that rulemak-
ing prevents "the disposition of individual cases from altering [the agency's) policies or 
(which is much the same thing) from implicitly generating policies that agency managers 
view as undesirable"). 
122. The Supreme Court approved such use of rulemaking in Heckler v. Campbell, 
461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983) (explaining that Social Security Administration could "rely on its 
rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration"). 
123. See Michael Asimow & Ronald M. Levin, State and Federal Administrative Law 
192 (3d ed. 2009) (describing historical shift from adjudication to rulemaking as primary 
method by which agencies implement policy); Magill, supra note 120, at 1398 (describing 
historical evolution of agency choice of procedure); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen 
Staszewski, The Supreme Court's Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administra-
tive Law, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1188, 1207 (2012) (describing advantages of rulemaking model 
over adjudication model with respect to policymaking); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 529, 
532, 537 (2005) (explaining differing cognitive contexts of adjudication and rulemaking). 
124. See Asimow & Levin, supra note 123, at 192-94 (explaining advantages of rule-
making over adjudication as tool for agency lawmaking and policymaking); Magill, supra 
note 120, at 1403 n.69 (collecting scholarship and noting general preference for rulemak-
ing over adjudication); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 123, at 1207-12 (articulating 
reasons for administrative law scholars' general preference for rulemaking over adjudica-
tion). 
125. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("[A) statutory 
grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to 
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settled expectations.126 Although the same might be said of retroactive 
adjudicatory pronouncements,127 they provoke less concern, in part, 
because parties enjoy more procedural safeguards in those trial-like 
settings than in rulemaking. 128 
The prospective nature of rulemaking is a drawback in private rights 
and restitution cases that operate in a dynamic, constantly changing reg-
ulatory environment. As the Supreme Court long ago observed, "prob-
lems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not rea-
sonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a 
relevant general rule." 129 If future regulatory problems are difficult to 
predict, applicable rules will be difficult to develop. Moreover, because a 
new rule cannot resolve a pending dispute, rulemaking does little to ad-
dress the past harms caused by regulatory wrongdoers. 130 
encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by 
Congress in express terms."). Indeed, Justice Scalia has argued that APA section 551(4) 
and the authoritative interpretation of the APA's distinctions contained in the 1947 Attor-
ney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act defined all Rules as having 
future rather than retroactive effect. Id. at 216-19 (Scalia,]., concurring) ("The only plau-
sible reading [of 5 U.S.C. § 551 ( 4)] is that rules have legal consequences only for the fu-
ture."). Categorizing rules as retroactive or prospective, however, is not always easy. See 
Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("The general 
legal principles governing retroactivity are relatively easy to state, although not as easy to 
apply."); William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 Duke 
LJ. 106, 109-10 (providing examples of differing views of retroactivity). 
126. Luneburg, supra note 125, at llO (arguing retroactive regulations "create 'sur-
prise' and a potential for undermining 'reasonable' reliance by affected parties"). 
127. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (considering whether retroactive impact of policy announced in agency adjudica-
tion resulted in unfair surprise and disruption of settled expectations). 
128. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (approving adjudication 
with retroactive legal consequences). But see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (holding that fleeting expletives and momentary nudity could not 
be found actionably indecent by Federal Communications Commission in adjudicatory 
proceeding because broadcasters did not have fair notice that conduct was actionable 
prior to broadcasts). 
129. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202. 
130. For the same reason, rulemaking proceedings cannot substitute for the creative 
array of coordinated pretrial procedures that this Article recommends-such as joint mo-
tions before single adjudicators, common discovery banks, and special settlement mas-
ters-that do not require a class action, but are nonetheless staples of multiparty litigation. 
See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of 
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 Duke LJ. 381, 386-408 (2000) (de-
scribing emergence of coordinated litigation outside of class litigation); Byron G. Stier, 
Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 Utah L. Rev. 863, 
892-95 (describing rise of multiparty litigation strategies used to achieve efficiencies in 
litigation outside of class litigation). 
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Second, rulemaking often cuts too broadly for groups seeking iden-
tical forms of relief.131 Just like a legislature that passes a new law, agen-
cies that create generally applicable rules may not anticipate how those 
rules will be applied in a variety of untested individual cases.132 At the 
same time, agency rules inevitably leave gaps and ambiguities that must 
be filled by individual adjudicators, just as statutes leave gaps that must 
be filled by agencies. 133 For example, the Social Security Administration's 
medical-vocational guidelines do not address claimants who suffer from 
some form of mental or psychiatric condition. 134 Twenty-five years after 
the Secretary issued vocational guidelines, courts and agency adjudica-
tors continue to dispute how they apply to these claimants, undermining 
the consistency and efficiency that the agency's rules were meant to 
promote. 135 
Third, individuals most impacted by agency adjudications in public 
rights cases often have the least access to the rulemaking process. Under 
the APA, the agency must follow notice and comment procedures before 
promulgating rules. 136 Theoretically, these procedures should ensure 
that the agency receives substantive input from the affected parties. The 
beneficiaries of many administrative programs, however, lack the 
influence that many regulated private entities have in rulemaking.137 To 
131. See Asimow & Levin, supra note 123, at 194 (noting rulemaking leads to princi-
ples that are "sometimes too broad, too narrow, or too rigid, because the agency fails to 
make allowances for some of the situations to which the rule will ultimately apply"). 
132. See Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202 ("[P]roblems may arise in a case which the admin-
istrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the 
absence of a relevant general rule."); Rachlinski, supra note 123, at 532 ("Relative to a 
rulemaking, ... an adjudication will focus the decisionmaker's gaze upon the individual 
~ase, ;,ather than the sociological, economic, or other structural aspects of the underlying 
ISSUe. ). 
133. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202-03 (noting "the agency must retain power to deal with 
[unforeseeable, new, and specialized] problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative 
process is to be effective"). 
134. See Jon C. Dubin, Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and 
Bureaucratically Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security 
Administration's Disability Programs, 62 Admin. L. Rev. 937, 942-43 (2010) (describing 
Campbell Court's recognition of "significant and elusive loophole" in Social Security 
Administration's medical-vocational guidelines for claimants with nonexertional limita-
tions). 
135. Id. at 943-44 (finding courts and agency adjudicators divided on proper meth-
odology for using medical-vocational guidelines and circumstances under which adjudica-
tors may deny claim without additional vocational or labor market evidence). 
136. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (2006). 
137. See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the 
Theory of Groups 53-65 ( 1965) (explaining that small, organized groups are usually more 
effective than larger groups in shaping policy); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1684-85 (1975) ("[A]gencies unduly 
favor organized interests, especially the interests of regulated or client business firms and 
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be sure, some public interest organizations do lobby on behalf of poor 
and politically marginalized groups, but such organizations lack the clout 
and resources of regulated industries that regularly participate m 
rulemaking. 138 Moreover, public interest organizations have more on 
their plate than they can handle just representing clients m 
proceedings. 139 
Fourth, rulemaking costs agencies significant resources and time. 
Agencies must prepare and issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM), await comments from interested parties and regulated entities, 
review and weigh the merits of these public comments, adjust their pro-
posed rule accordingly, resolve the internal debates of policymakers, and 
clearly explain why they adopted the final rule that they did, 140 all while 
under the scrutiny of the political branches. 141 One comprehensive study 
found that the average duration of significant rulemaking proceedings 
was more than 500 days. 142 The obstacles agencies face when creating 
new rules capable of surviving judicial and congressional review also may 
make agency decisionmaking more rigid and inflexible. 143 As a result, 
other organized groups at the expense of ... comparatively unorganized interests such as 
consumers, environmentalists, and the poor."). 
138. Peter M. Shane, Madison's Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens Ameri-
can Democracy 162 (2009) ("Industry is far more effectively represented in administrative 
policy making than the general public."); Stewart, supra note 137, at 1684-87 (listing ex-
planations for perceived biases of agencies, including '"capture' scenario, in which admin-
istrations are systematically controlled, sometimes corruptly, by the business firms within 
their orbit of responsibility"). 
139. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing organizations' growing 
caseloads and shrinking budgets). 
140. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (describing basic requirements ofrulemaking). 
141. Indeed, all "significant regulatory actions" must be submitted to the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Mfairs (OIRA) within the White House Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), along with a formal cost-benefit analysis, before they are 
promulgated. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 646-48 (1993), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 at 745-49 (2006); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 
Qan. 18, 2011) (permitting consideration of "difficult to quantify" values in cost-benefit 
analysis); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1263-64 (2006) (describing President Reagan's "unprece-
dented level of control over the administrative apparatus"). 
142. See Letter from Jacob E. Gersen, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., & Anne Joseph 
O'Connell, Berkeley Sch. of Law, to Jessica Hertz, Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Feb. 27, 
2009), available at http:/ /www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/ Anne..Joseph_ 
OConnell.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Some agencies take much longer. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, for example, took nearly twenty years to im-
plement some provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act. Cornelius M. Kerwin, 
Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy 105-07 (2d ed. 1999) 
(describing severe delays in rulemaking by administrative agencies). 
143. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Di-
minishing Agency Resources, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 61, 85-87 (1997) ("[L]ooking only at the 
short-term effects of the alternatives available to the courts, there is little doubt that a flex-
ible, forgiving judicial approach is vastly superior to ... rigid adherence to doctrine .... "); 
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some agencies implement new policies by adjudicating cases and eschew 
rulemaking altogether;144 others increasingly rely on informal guidance 
documents. 145 
To be sure, class actions and other kinds of aggregate litigation may 
initially consume time and resources, too. Like most forms of rulemak-
ing, aggregated litigation also may require notice to absent parties, fol-
lowed by a decision that broadly applies to many different people. 146 
Even so, aggregation may also yield efficiencies by pooling information 
and reducing duplicative caseloads.147 In the long run, aggregation may 
even save on remands by encouraging better advocacy and record-
development in "trial-level" hearings-the absence of which remains a 
common problem in veterans' benefits, black lung, immigration, and 
Social Security hearings. 148 In addition, adjudicatory decisions need not 
Mark Seidenfeld, DemystifYing Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To ModifY 
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 483, 520-21 (1997) 
(discussing uncertainty resulting from agencies' inability to predict depth of analysis that 
reviewing court will deem sufficient); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment 
of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 Ohio St. LJ. 251, 251-52 (2009) 
("(A]dministrative law scholars have identified hard look judicial review of agency action 
... as one of, if not the major, impediment to regulatory flexibility."). 
144. Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Prosecution: The Securities and Exchange 
Commission vs. Corporate America 105-06 (1982) (discussing both prosecutorial and 
promotional SEC regulatory activity);Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for 
Auto Safety 14 (1990) (describing shift from traditional safety regulation to adjudicatory 
enforcement and recalls). 
145. See Magill, supra note 120, at 1411 (noting "increased reliance on guidance 
documents"). The ITC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) generally avoid 
rulemaking and rely solely on adjudication to make policy. See, e.g., Mark H. Grunewald, 
The NLRB's First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 Duke L.J. 274, 274 (1991) 
(noting NLRB's almost exclusive reliance upon adjudication); Paul R. Verkuil, The Pur-
poses and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke LJ. 257, 263 (noting FTC's heavy 
reliance upon adjudication). Others, such as the EEOC and the Patent and Trademark 
Office, are statutorily prohibited from engaging in legislative rulemaking to interpret their 
enabling statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006) (delegating to EEOC merely 
procedural rulemaking power); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The 
Patent Office's Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2051, 2053 
(2009) ("[T]he PTO lack(s] substantive rulemaking authority."). 
146. See infra Part III.B.2, .C.3 (discussing requirements for class certification and 
tools minimizing notice and representation problems). 
14 7. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.l (discussing efficiencies yielded by aggregating cases); 
infra notes 337-347 and accompanying text (same). 
148. See, e.g., Bd. of Veterans' Appeals, supra note 2, at 5-6 (acknowledging need to 
eliminate avoidable remands and citing Board of Veterans' Appeals remand rate of 
36.8%); Black Lung Benefits Program, supra note 15, at 31 (describing high remand rate 
among Black Lung claimants and observing that "many claimants are not equipped with 
the medical and legal resources they need to develop evidence that will meet the pro-
gram's requirement~"); ABA, Reforming the Immigration System, supra note 2, at 5-10 
(finding that "[w]ithout [legal] assistance, the efficiency of the [immigration] proceedings 
is significantly damaged as noncitizens do not have competent counsel to help prepare 
testimony, assemble documents, and conduct legal research"); U.S. Gov't Accountability 
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be as comprehensive as rulemaking, nor resolve every policy disagree-
ment within the agency, leaving secondary or contentious questions to 
another adjudicatory or rulemaking proceeding. 149 
Moreover, unlike rulemaking-a top-down solution that is often 
commenced and managed by the head of an agency-aggregation in-
volves a "bottom-up" remedy, where groups of people actually involved in 
agency proceedings play a role in crafting discrete, retrospective forms of 
relief. In the process, independent ALJs also provide an important neu-
tral perspective to resolve commonly contested issues of proof, such as 
untested scientific evidence. Since groups may appeal their collective 
claims to the head of the agency, aggregated adjudication can offer 
agencies a different viewpoint about how a particular regulation impacts 
people on the ground. 150 
Rulemaking indisputably provides advantages over individualized ad-
judication, particularly when an agency must determine broad, 
longstanding policies for the general public. Aggregated adjudication, 
however, provides an effective alternative for frequently recurring nar-
row, discrete, or retrospective legal and factual questions that impact 
groups of people otherwise marginalized from the agencies' political 
rulemaking process. In the process, as discussed more fully below in Part 
III.D, the agency class action can provide an important signal to the 
agency and the political branches that large groups of people are being 
adversely affected in a common way, thus provoking the agency to con-
sider whether a new rule ought to be crafted. 
B. Stare Decisis 
Although the doctrine of "stare decisis" aspires to make administra-
tive decisions more consistent by requiring that administrative judges 
justifY their opinions with precedent, stare decisis does not ensure uni-
form outcomes in a system where reasoned, published, and binding deci-
sions are in short supply. Moreover, stare decisis may invite additional 
inefficiencies and obstacles to legal representation. 
Stare decisis enhances consistency by requiring adjudicators gener-
ally to respect questions of law settled by other adjudicators in the same 
or a higher tribunal. 151 Stare decisis also enhances efficiency, reducing 
Office, GAQ-09-398, Additional Performance Measures and Better Cost Estimates Could 
Help Improve SSA's Efforts To Eliminate Its Hearings Backlog 13-17 (2009), available at 
http:/ /www.gao.gov/new.items/d09398.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (de-
scribing efforts to reduce Social Security Administration's hearings-level backlogs, includ-
ing hiring additional administrative law judges and screening potentially favorable claims). 
149. Asimow & Levin, supra note 123, at 195. 
150. Id. at 194 (noting how adjudication allows agency to observe operation of rules 
in concrete cases). 
151. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911-12 (2010) ("Our precedent is to 
be respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts 
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the burden lower courts would suffer if they had to repeatedly decide the 
same questions of law. 152 Although the AP A does not technically require 
stare decisis in adjudication,153 some agency tribunals make precedential 
decisions that bind "trial-level" administrative judges. 154 Centralized re-
viewing bodies, such as the Social Security Administration's Appeals 
Council155 and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),156 attempt to 
maintain uniformity and enhance efficiency by deciding issues that re-
peatedly percolate up from below. 
Administrative appellate bodies, however, are poorly positioned to 
issue well-reasoned, precedential decisions. During the 2011 fiscal year, 
for example, Social Security's Appeals Council received 173,332 requests 
for review, processed 126,992 requests for review, and still had 153,004 
requests for review pending at the end of the year. 157 The average pro-
cessing time was approximately one year.158 Moreover, overworked ALJs 
barely manage to follow even a fraction of those appellate decisions. 1';9 
Finally, in some cases, an appellate body itself may not even know about 
its own prior decisions. 160 
Stare decisis also suffers, albeit to a lesser degree, from many of the 
same drawbacks as individual adjudication. Stare decisis may establish a 
rule based on the unique characteristics of an individual case, without 
us on a course that is sure error."); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) ("We 
recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element 
of continuity in law .... "). 
152. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 651, 677-
78 (1995) (noting efficiency arguments related to stare decisis). 
153. Mashaw et al., Administrative Law, supra note 121, at 436 (describing when 
agency's refusal to follow prior decisions must be explained). 
154. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,765-66 (1969) ("Subject to 
the qualified role of stare decisis in the administrative process, ... [adjudicated cases] may 
serve as precedents."); Magill, supra note 120, at 1394 (noting precedential effects of or-
ders concluding NLRB and FERC adjudications). 
155. See Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Kaplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A 
Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 
17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 199, 280 (1990) (discussing Social Security's Appeals Council's suc-
cess in promoting uniform application of relevant laws and policies). 
156. See Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 
481,499-500 (2005) (noting BIA's practice of selecting certain opinions for publication as 
guidelines for lower tribunals based on "the nature of the facts or issues presented"). 
157. General Appeals Council Statistics, Soc. Sec. Online, http:/ /www.ssa.gov/ 
appeals/ac_statistics.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last modified May 25, 
2012). 
158. Id. (noting average processing time of 360 days). 
159. See Mashaw et al., Administrative Law, supra note 121, at 457 (discussing why 
precedent-based decisions are not realistic for ALJs in Social Security disability cases). 
160. ld. at 436-37 (discussing cases when regulatory bodies departed from their own 
precedents). 
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regard to the broader implications the decision may have on others. 161 
Moreover, the precedential decision may not be the product of the best 
record, and therefore may cause more problems than it solves. 162 
Finally, stare decisis does little to improve access to representation. 
In fact, an adjudicatory system that relies on stare decisis creates more 
work for lawyers, requiring counsel to find relevant precedents, interpret 
their significance to the case at hand, and advocate how they should be 
applied. 163 The complexity of a system rooted in case-by-case decision-
making makes legal representation even more critical. 
In sum, stare decisis is at best a weak tool for ensuring uniformity in 
administrative proceedings. And in some ways, stare decisis may even ag-
gravate existing inefficiencies and obstacles to legal representation. Ag-
gregate litigation, by contrast, may simultaneously improve uniformity, 
efficiency, and access to qualified counsel in a single proceeding. 
C. Statutory Attorneys' Fees 
Attorneys' fees statutes and legal services organizations improve ac-
cess to legal representation in agency adjudications. Many people, how-
ever, must forgo counsel when they raise risky or complex legal ques-
tions164 or otherwise fail to qualify for free legal services. In addition, pro 
bono legal services and fee shifting provisions do little to improve the 
efficiency or consistency of administrative proceedings. 165 
Unlike defendants in criminal cases, parties in agency adjudications 
have no constitutional right to legal representation. 166 Thus, if they want 
161. See Magill, supra note 120, at 1396 (suggesting how facts of individual cases may 
distort evaluation of broader policy questions). 
162. See Derek Smith, A Refugee by Any Other Name: An Examination of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals' Actions in Asylum Cases, 75 Va. L. Rev. 681, 706 (1989) (noting 
BIA publishes only about thirty decisions per year and went for several years without pub-
lishing any decisions sustaining appeal of applicant seeking asylum, allegedly because it 
did not want to give asylum applicants blueprint for success); see also Magill, supra note 
120, at 1396 (noting adjudicatory decisions lack broad public input necessary for develop-
ing sound rules); Editorial, Irrationality in Deportation Law, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 2012, at 
A24 (noting how BIA often "rubber-stamps deportation rulings with no written opinion or 
explanation"). 
163. See, e.g., 2 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice§ 5:67 (3d ed. 
2010) (explaining how stare decisis disadvantages unsophisticated claimants who lack 
resources to be informed of individual decisions in mass justice adjudicatory system). 
164. See infra notes 172-176 and accompanying text (discussing bankrolling risky le-
gal challenges). 
165. See infra text accompanying note 177 (discussing difficulty of ensuring that dif-
ferent adjudicators resolve cases in same way). 
166. See Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 221 (9th Cir. 1969) (denying request for new 
hearing because petitioner had opportunity to appoint counsel, petitioner did not allege 
deprivation of right to counsel, and government was not obligated to provide counsel); 
Boruski v. SEC, 340 F.2d 991,992 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding counsel need not be appointed 
in administrative proceedings). 
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an attorney, they generally must pay according to an hourly rate, fee-for-
seiVices, or contingency agreement.167 The Equal Access to Justice Act 
(EAJA) requires agencies to pay attorneys' fees and other expenses of 
"prevailing" parties in "adversary" adjudications, unless the position of 
the agency was "substantially justified or ... special circumstances make 
an award unjust." 168 Congress also funds free legal seiVices through the 
Legal SeiVices Corporation (LSC) for "legal assistance in noncriminal 
proceedings" to persons "financially unable to afford legal assistance." 169 
However, just like in civil litigation, the cost of legal representation in 
agency adjudication discourages parties from pursuing claims with com-
petent counsel, unless ( 1) the value of their claims justifies the cost of an 
attorney, given the likelihood of success;170 (2) a fee shifting statute re-
quires another party to pay the attorneys' fees of the claimant;171 or (3) a 
competent attorney can provide legal representation pro bono or at a 
reduced rate. 172 
Although fee shifting statutes, like the EAJA, improve access to legal 
representation, they still may require parties and their attorneys to bank-
roll risky legal challenges until victory. Attorneys may turn down cases 
without reasonable confidence of success and, quite rationally, focus 
their attention on the easiest and most promising cases. While legal ser-
vices organizations generally rely on government funding, rather than 
167. See How To Hire an Attorney, Legal Connection, http://www.legalconnection. 
com/hire.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (outlining 
steps to take when hiring attorney). 
168. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2006). To be a "prevailing party," the party must be 
awarded some relief by the court on the merits of its claim. Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 & n.5 (2001) 
("[The] view that a 'prevailing party' is one who has been awarded some relief by the court 
can be distilled from our prior cases."). Specific fee shifting provisions also exist in many 
benefits statutes. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 
2004 § 615(i) (3) (B)-(G), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B)-(G) (2006) (providing attorneys' fees 
under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act 
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (providing attorneys' fees to plaintiffs prevailing in 
enforcing, inter alia, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964). See gener-
ally Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public 
Interest Litigation, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1984, at 233, 233 (citing more than 
150 federal fee shifting statutes). 
169. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a). 
170. See, e.g., Black Lung Benefits Program, supra note 15, at 26-27 (noting reluc-
tance of attorneys to take cases with high costs and low likelihood of success). 
171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (reviewing role of fee shifting provi-
sions in public interest litigation). 
172. Legal services organizations sometimes train lawyers to represent individuals pro 
bono in administrative hearings. See, e.g., Legal Aid Society 2011-2012 Training Series, 
NYC Pro Bono Center, http://www.probono.net/ny/nyc/las-trainings-2011-2012 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (offering numerous online pro 
bono training seminars). 
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legal victories, to cover their operational costs, 173 parties in administrative 
proceedings may be too wealthy to qualify for LSC representation174 yet 
not wealthy enough to afford competent private legal counsel. 175 And for 
those who are eligible, legal services organizations, just like the adminis-
trative courts in which they represent clients, must handle ever-growing 
caseloads with ever-shrinking budgets.176 
Moreover, attorneys' fees statutes and LSC funding do little to im-
prove the efficiency or consistency of agency adjudications themselves. 
Competent counsel can only do so much to ensure that different adjudi-
cators will ultimately resolve cases in the same way.177 Individualized rep-
resentation will not cure the redundancy of agency adjudications that 
repeatedly address the same questions of law and fact. 178 
173. For example, all but $1 million of Legal Services New York City's $53.5 million 
in total operating support and revenue came from government grants and private philan-
thropy in 2011. Legal Servs. NYC, 2011 Annual Report 20 (2011), available at http:/ I 
www.legalservicesnyc.org/ storage/lsny /PDFs/2011 %20annual %20report. pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). Attorneys' fees recovered from adverse parties contributed only 
$383,769, as compared to $38 million in government grants and contracts. Id. 
174. Individuals must generally have incomes at or below 125% of the federal poverty 
level (an annual income of $28,813 for a family of four) to be eligible for representation 
by LSC-funded programs. What is LSC?, Legal Services Corp., http:/ /lsc.gov/about/what-
is-Isc (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
175. The cost of legal representation in Southern California for an adult detained in 
removal proceedings, for example, is approximately $4,000-$5,000. How to Find Legal 
Help for Non-Detained Adults, Esperanza Immigrant Rts. Project, http:/ /www.esperanza-
la.org/index. php?option=com_con tent&view=article&catid=9:for-immigrants&id=81 :how-
to-find-legal-help-for-non-detained-adult~ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2012). For one firm surveyed by the GAO, the cost of legal representation 
for miners pursuing claims for black lung disease ranges from $18,000 for a case that takes 
two to four years to $70,000 for a case that takes seven or more years. Black Lung Benefits 
Program, supra note 15, at 26-27. 
176. See Karen Sloan, Perfect Storm Hits Legal Aid: Struggling Programs Face Grim 
Forecast as the New Year Opens, Nat'! LJ.,Jan. 3, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.law. 
com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJjsp?id=1202476843961 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(discussing sharp declines in funding for legal services organizations); see also Legal Servs. 
Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of 
Low-Income Americans 1-3 (2009), available at www.lafla.org/pdf/justice_Gap09.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that LSC-funded programs must turn away half 
of those who seek help due to resource constraints); Government Falters in Effort To 
Reduce Massive Backlog of Disability Hearings, Transactional Records Access Clearing-
house (June 20, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/ssa/253/ (on file with the Colum-
bia Law Review) (describing decline in number of full-time Social Security ALJs from 
December 2010 (1,431) to March 2011 (1,396) despite 5% increase in massive backlog of 
Social Security claims). 
177. See supra Part I.B.1 (detailing risks of inconsistency in agency adjudicatory out-
comes). 
178. See supra Part I.B.2 (detailing inefficiencies of redundant agency adjudica-
tions). 
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As set forth below, the class action was developed to solve just such 
problems in civil litigation. By aggregating a large number of small 
claims, attorneys make representation affordable by maximizing econo-
mies of scale. Moreover, by resolving common questions of law and fact 
in a single proceeding, class actions and other aggregate procedures im-
prove efficiency and ensure consistent treatment of similarly situated par-
ties.179 
D. Judicial Review 
Judicial review ensures that agencies interpret and apply the law 
consistently with "a permissible construction" of their organic statute180 
and reduces the chance that agencies will treat similar cases in different 
ways. Parties must also receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to 
be heard by a neutral decisionmaker in adjudication.181 Finally, federal 
courts can compel agencies to act where adjudication becomes unrea-
sonably delayed.182 Judicial review thus promotes timely legal access and 
improves uniform and accurate decisionmaking. 
Unfortunately, there are drawbacks to relying exclusively on courts 
to provide uniformity, efficiency, and access to justice in agency proceed-
ings. First, Congress bars judicial review of many agency decisions. For 
example, the 1998 Veterans' Judicial Review Act bars courts from review-
ing decisions by the Secretary of Veteran Affairs or his delegate on "all 
questions of law or fact necessary to a decision" involving veterans' bene-
fits.183 Likewise, not only does the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act substantially limit review of immigration 
and deportation orders,184 but it also bars class actions for those remain-
ing issues subject to judicial oversight. 185 
Second, the federal judicial system, sometimes for good reason, 
cannot ensure the consistency of lower court decisions. 186 Different trial 
179. See infra Part liLA (reviewing advantages of aggregate litigation). 
180. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
181. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 325 n.4 (1976) (reciting Goldbergs holding that parties must receive timely, 
effective notice and opportunity for hearing). 
182. 5 u.s.c. § 706(1) (2006). 
183. 38 U.S.C. §§ 511(a), 512 (2006); see also Bates v. Nicholson, 398 F.3d 1355, 
1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (interpreting provision barring federal court review of Secre-
tary's findings oflaw and fact). 
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2)(B)(ii) (2006) (stating "no court shall have jurisdiction to 
review" decisions "specified ... to be in the discretion of the Attorney General"). 
185. I d. § 1252 (f) (I) (discussing limits on injunctive relief); see also Gerald L. 
Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1661, I686-87 (2000) 
(interpreting scope of provision limiting class-wide relief in immigration cases). 
186. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a Good Day for aJudge To Lay Down 
His Professional Life for Justice, 32 Fordham Urb. LJ 131, 146-58 (2004) (describing 
exercise of judicial independence by federal district court judges who opposed racism, 
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and appellate courts may interpret the same set of laws and facts in very 
different ways. 187 Unless the United States Supreme Court provides defin-
itive guidance, circuit splits fracture administrative decisionmaking in-
volving the same kind of harm.188 As appeals from agency decisions work 
their way through the federal courts, the decisions of federal district 
courts carry little to no weight in other circuits, undermining the ability 
of judicial review to impose consistency on agency decisions.189 Agencies 
also sometimes choose not to "acquiesce" to the federal courts until the 
Supreme Court steps in to resolve the disagreement between the agency 
and one or more courts of appeals. 190 
Even in the rare cases that reach the Supreme Court, judicial review 
may fail to resolve inconsistencies out of deference to agency fact-
finding, policy decisions, and interpretations of broad or ambiguous 
statutes. For example, in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. 
Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Communications Commission was entitled to choose a different con-
disproportionate sentencing, and other perceived forms of "injustice"); Charles E. 
Wyzanski,Jr., A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1298-99 
(1952) (discussing federal tria1judges' motivations for departing from precedent). 
187. See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1453, 1460-
63 (2010) (discussing binding versus persuasive precedent in federal judicial system). 
188. Circuit splits in asylum applications, for example, mean that the following deci-
sions by administrative judges will differ based upon the residence of the applicant: 
(1) whether the applicant has been convicted of a "particularly serious crime," 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 (b) (3) (B) (ii); and (2) whether applicants have suffered "extreme cmelty," Id. 
§ 1182(a) (6) (A)(ii)(ll) (a). For differing analyses of the reviewability of administrative de-
termination of "serious crime," compare, for example, Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 
987 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that determination of "serious crime" is committed to agency 
discretion and therefore unreviewable (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii))), with 
Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 150-55 (2d Cir. 2008) (reaching contrary conclu-
sion). For an analysis of the reviewability of "extreme cruelty," see Wilmore v. Gonzales, 
455 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting circuit split on question whether determination 
of "extreme cmelty" is discretionary and thus unreviewable in federal court). For further 
discussion of the impact of an applicant's residence-and, therefore, the circuit to which 
an applicant may appeal an adverse decision-on the final disposition of his case, see 
Ramji-Nogales eta!., Proposals for Reform, supra note 1, at 77-86 (observing a~ylum appli-
cants win remands eighteen times more often when appealing decisions to Seventh Circuit 
than when appealing to Fourth Circuit). 
189. See Dobbins, supra note 187, at 1462-63 ("Even an on-point holding may carry 
little weight with a court of appeals if it was written by a magistrate judge in a district out-
side that appellate court's geographical circuit."). 
190. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 98 Yale LJ. 679, 681 (1989) ("The selective refusal of administrative 
agencies to conduct their internal proceedings consistently with adverse rulings of the 
courts of appeals-a practice commonly termed agency nonacquiescence-is not new in 
American law."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative 
Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 Admin. L. 
Rev. 889, 902 (2007) ("American administrative agencies have often declined to acquiesce 
to judicial mlings .... "). 
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struction of an ambiguous statute than the Ninth Circuit's "best interpre-
tation.''191 Even as stare decisis constrains the Ninth Circuit from chang-
ing its own position, the Supreme Court recognized that the APA allows 
agencies substantial room to change their interpretation of an ambigu-
ous statute. 
Third, the inefficiencies produced by the absence of aggregation in 
agency adjudication replicate themselves in the federal judiciary as courts 
must review the same questions in multiple proceedings. 192 Moreover, 
many cases involve unrepresented parties who lack the skill to develop 
facts before the agency, much less argue complex legal questions on ap-
peal.193 More individual adjudicatory proceedings addressing the same 
underdeveloped questions of law or fact only produce more federal court 
cases that must review these decisions. The trend overwhelms the federal 
courts in the same way that the rising tide of public rights cases has over-
whelmed the agencies that hear such claims.194 
E. Federal Court Class Actions 
Although courts have certified classes of individuals aggrieved by 
agency adjudications, class actions in federal court often come too late-
after a record has been established, sometimes without the aid of coun-
sel-or not at all, because they are foreclosed either by statute or by pro-
cedural and substantive hurdles. 
First, in many cases, the federal court class action is not available be-
cause Congress has barred judicial review.195 1n addition, since 1996, 
Congress has prohibited the recipients of LSC funds from initiating or 
participating in class actions, making it much more difficult for poor and 
191. 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) ("[T]he agency may, consistent with the court's hold-
ing, choose a different construction, since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter 
(within the limits of reason) of such statutes."). 
192. See Anna 0. Law, Rationing Justice?: The Effect of Caseload Pressures on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals in Immigration Cases 32-33 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http:/ /works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=lOOO&context 
=anna_law (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing how Second and Ninth 
Circuits have struggled to process surge in appeals from BlA and have begun bundling 
multiple cases presenting same legal issues). 
193. See Nina Bernstein, In City of Lawyers, Many Immigrants Fighting Deportation 
Go It Alone, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2009, at A21 (noting that while "[s]tudies show immi-
grants with legal representation are three to four times more likely to win their case ... 
only about 35 percent have any kind of lawyer"); see also Black Lung Benefits Program, 
supra note 15, at 26 ("[F]inding representation is a significant challenge for many [black 
lung] claimants."). 
194. In 2004, appeals from the immigration courts accounted for approximately 17% 
of all federal appeals cases and nearly 40% of the appeals cases in New York and 
California. Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 26, 2005, at Al. 
195. See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text (highlighting provisions of U.S. 
Code imposing limitations on reviewing courts). 
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low-income beneficiaries in public rights cases to obtain class counsel. 196 
Even where judicial review is available, in many cases, agency decisions, 
such as those of the BIA, can be reviewed only by the courts of appeals, 
which also cannot aggregate claims. 197 
Second, because parties are generally required to exhaust their ad-
ministrative remedies before going to federal court, plaintiffs may not be 
able to certify a class during agency adjudications. 198 The class must ei-
ther present a constitutional claim that the agency cannot adjudicate199 
or allege that the agency is acting toward the class in a uniform manner 
at odds with its own statute or regulations and that the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies would be futile. 200 Such claims, however, do not 
help agencies adjudicate more efficiently, consistently, or fairly. They 
merely correct the most egregious outcomes. 
Finally, reforming agency procedures through the federal court class 
action deprives agencies of the opportunity to take the first crack at rea-
soned decisionmaking with the same focused attention and information 
available to a federal court in a class action. It is inconsistent with the 
values underlying the doctrines of exhaustion and ripeness, which seek 
to give agencies the first opportunity to address issues within their 
196. William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: 
Congress and the Legal SeiVices Corporation from the 1960's to the 1990's, 17 St. Louis U. 
Pub. L. Rev. 241, 256--61 (1998) (reviewing history of restrictions on LSC programs engag-
ing in funding, lobbying, class action suits, seiVice to immigrants, and training for political 
activities); David Udell & Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Access to Justice: 
Opening the Courthouse Door 5 (2007), available at http:/ /brennan.3cdn.net/ 
297f4fabb202470c67_3vm6i6ar9.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing 
federal limitations prohibiting LSC.funded lawyers from bringing class actions, seeking 
court-ordered attorneys' fees awards, communicating with policymakers on clients' be-
halves, and representing certain immigrants, incarcerated people, and drug offenders). 
197. As a result, circuit court judges have complained of the deluge of immigration 
cases they hear on appeal from the BIA. See Tony Mauro, CircuitJudges Decry Immigra-
tion Case 'Tsunami,' Nat'! LJ. (Aug. 12, 2008), http:/ /www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticle 
NLJJsp?id=1202423697849&slreturn=20120624163745 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (quoting Judge M. Margaret McKeown describing surge in immigration cases as 
"tsunami"). 
198. See, e.g., United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952) 
("Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, 
requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions un-
less the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the 
time appropriate under its practice."). 
199. See, e.g., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 486 (1986) (waiving exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies requirement for class action alleging Social Security 
Administration policies violated Constitution); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Nelson, 872 
F.2d 1555, 1561 (lith Cir. 1989) (finding no exhaustion requirement for constitutional 
claims agency cannot adjudicate), afl'd sub nom. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 
u.s. 479 (1991). 
200. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326--27 (1988) (holding that plaintiffs are 
not required to exhaust administrative remedies where it would be utterly futile). 
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purview. 201 Indeed, one of the criticisms of judicial reform of administra-
tive programs is that the political branches, not the courts, should cor-
rect agency errors.202 Providing agencies with the opportunity to address 
systemic problems through aggregation mechanisms is respectful of the 
responsibilities allocated to them by Congress. Moreover, aggregation 
may provide federal courts with a more fully developed and consolidated 
record with which to review agency decisionmaking. 
F. Informal Aggregation and Settlement 
In the absence of formal rules on group claims, some agencies have 
experimented with informal aggregation-coordinating, channeling, 
and settling cases using managerial control, test cases, and systems of al-
ternative dispute resolution. To date, however, unlike class actions and 
other forms of procedural aggregation, such half-measures lack the 
transparency and consistency necessary to remedy systemic violations of 
claimants' rights. 
First, agencies have long sought to adopt practices that centralize 
the review and management of ALJs to ensure that individualized hear-
ings produce consistent and accurate results.203 For example, the 
Department of Justice periodically reviews the work of individual immi-
gration judges and members of the BIA. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that 
such review does more than cure the most egregious outliers.204 More-
over, management controls inevitably raise questions concerning the in-
dependence of agency adjudicators.205 Finally, reviewing the outcomes of 
201. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969) (observing that ex-
haustion doctrine ensures that agencies may apply statutory scheme to novel facts effi· 
ciently and autonomously, while reducing need for additional appeals); Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (noting that ripeness doctrine "protect[s) ... agen-
cies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its 
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties"). 
202. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Con-
straints on Agency Discretion, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 429, 487 (1999) (arguing reform and 
review of agency outcomes is "best effectuated by the political branches ... rather than the 
courts"). 
203. See Ronald A. Cass, Allocation of Authority Within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evi-
dence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 10-14 (1986) (examining different 
agency review structures); Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Rlmlette in an Administrative Law 
Context: The Deja Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 
475, 481 (2007) (observing that "agency heads may exercise supervisory oversight over 
agency adjudicators, and usually have some degree of control over their decisions as 
well"). 
204. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., Proposals for Reform, supra note 1, at 17-31 
(finding dramatic disparities within and among asylum offices despite quality control, 
training, and multiple layers of supervision). 
205. See, e.g., Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 
(D.D.C. 1984) (finding Social Security Administration's plan to improve consistency 
among ALJs by reviewing their decisions to award benefits "created an untenable atrnos-
2032 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1992 
adjudications does nothing to improve their efficiency or the parties' ac-
cess to justice. 
Second, some administrative agencies have used special masters, like 
courts, to resolve novel issues with broad-ranging effects through test 
cases and bellwether trials. Within weeks of the September 11 attacks, for 
example, Congress created the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund of 2001 to provide wrongful death and personal injury benefits to 
victims and family members.206 President George W. Bush appointed 
Kenneth R. Feinberg as a special master to administer the Fund.207 
Feinberg met with representative counsel to identifY and decide fourteen 
"test cases" that would establish the rough boundaries for the sizes of 
awards and define his manner of handling repeat issues before the 
Fund.208 Later cases tested Feinberg's willingness to make awards for 
high-wage earners, like stockbrokers, who died in the attack,209 some-
thing he had said publicly that he was loath to do.210 Others helped settle 
the question of how he handled claims brought by low-wage earners, or-
phans, or family members who provided unpaid but invaluable services, 
like taking care of a sick relative or doing household chores.211 Mter 
months of speculation about the mechanics and fairness of the compen-
sation process, the procedure gave claimants and their counsel more cer-
tainty and trust in the process.212 
Since that time, Feinberg and other special masters have used test 
cases to resolve other kinds of common issues in adjudication, like setting 
terms for executive compensation in the wake of the global financial cri-
sis,213 determining eligibility for compensation for the British Petroleum 
phere of tension and unfairness" that threatened "decisional independence the APA af-
fords to administrative law judges"). 
206. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 
§§ 401-407, 115 Stat. 230, 237-40 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note) (stipulating 
terms of compensation program). 
207. See, e.g., September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66, 
274, 66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) (naming Feinberg special mas-
ter); 1 Kenneth R. Feinberg et al., Dep't of justice, Final Report of the Special Master for 
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of2001, at 4 (2004) (same). 
208. David W. Chen, Fund for Terror Attack Victims Offers Awards in 14 Test Cases, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2002, at Bl. 
209. See id. (noting forthcoming cases for high-wage earners). 
210. See Feinberg et al., supra note 207, at 82 (noting divisiveness of providing 
higher awards to high-wage earners and stating preference for flat award system). 
211. Chen, supra note 208. 
212. See Brian H. Bornstein & Susan Poser, Perceptions of Procedural and Distribu-
tive Justice in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 17 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 
75, 95 (2007) (finding claimants to September 11th Fund "were more satisfied with proce-
dural than distributive aspects of the Fund and perceptions of justice were correlated with 
the amount of compensation participants received"). 
213. Mark Trumbull, Executive Pay: How Much Say Should Obama 'Czar' Receive?, 
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 28, 2009, at 12 (describing "Feinberg approach" involving 
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oil spill,214 evaluating whether thimerosal (a vaccine preservative contain-
ing mercury) causes autism in children,215 and resolving difficult proce-
dural and scientific causation questions raised by the recently passed in-
carnation of the September 11th Fund.216 Without formal authority or 
rules to coordinate such claims, however, some have complained that this 
kind of informal process invites too much discretion and too little trans-
parency.217 
Finally, agencies may rely on private dispute resolution systems to 
settle common disputes. In the 1990s, Congress required administrative 
agencies to incorporate mediation and private arbitration systems in or-
der to exploit the time savings and predictability that alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) offered.218 The Department of Health and Human 
Services now uses ADR to manage and settle hundreds of thousands of 
Medicaid claims with state agencies;219 the United States Post Office also 
resolves tens of thousands of workplace disputes through a well-known 
mediation program, known as "REDRESS;"220 and the Internal Revenue 
consultation with academics and experts to set pay for top twenty-five executives at firms 
that received funds through Troubled Asset Relief Program); Editorial, Pay Cuts at Bailout 
Companies: A Real-Life Test Case, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 22, 2009, at 18. 
214. Tim Webb, Brent Coon: Tough Talking Lawyer Going Mter BP on His Harley, 
Guardian (June 26, 2010), http:/ /www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jun/27/bp-brent-
coon-oil-spill-claims (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing test case for lost 
business income filed with Gulf Coast Claim Facility on behalf of strip club). 
215. Thomas H. Maugh II & Andrew Zajac, Court Rejects Vaccine Link to Autism, 
L.A. Times, Mar. 13, 2010, at AI (describing process where special masters determined 
outcome in three separate test cases out of more than 5,300 thimerosal-related claims). 
216. Cf. Raymond Hernandez, In Step to Reopen 9/11 Health Fund, Administrator 
Is Named, N.Y. Times, May 19, 2011, at A21 (quoting newly appointed special master 
Sheila Birnbaum as stating "[m]y first priority will be to sit down with the people who will 
be most affected by the program, and see how we can design a program that is fair, trans-
parent and easy to navigate"). 
217. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Com-
pensation Fund, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 719, 763-64 (2003) (claiming informality of test cases 
created "market" for those attorneys with specialized knowledge of Feinberg himself). 
218. See Jeffrey M. Senger, Federal Dispute Resolution 3 (2004) ("ADR reduces ... 
delays by sidestepping the adjudicative process and its backlogs."); see also Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Act of-1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 651 note) (covering alternative dispute resolution); Administrative Dispute Resolution 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584) (cover-
ing alternative means of dispute resolution in administrative process); Administrative 
Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 4, 104 Stat. 2736, 2737-45 (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584) (same). 
219. See Daniel Marcus &Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal Government: Not 
Such Strange Bedfellows Mter All, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 709, 720-21 (2001) (describing 
Department of Health and Human Services' use of ADR to manage its dispute process). 
220. The REDRESS program is offered to United States Postal Service employees as 
part of the equal employment opportunity complaint process. See REDRESS, U.S. Postal 
Service, http:/ /about.usps.com/what-we-are-doing/redress/welcome.htrn (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
2034 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1992 
Service (IRS) Appeals Office, which handles over 55,000 cases each year, 
settles taxpayer disputes before trial in 85% of those cases.221 
While ADR can and should play a role in streamlining agency adju-
dication, such programs also lack transparency, produce power imbal-
ances, and may undermine consistency. In Medicare benefit denials, for 
example, patients often lack the information-not to mention the en-
durance-to continue protracted disputes with more powerful govern-
ment authorities over critical questions of medical treatment.222 The IRS 
Appeals Court's ADR system may produce unfair results, particularly for 
complainants with small claims who lack the resources or incentives to 
litigate fully. 223 Mediation alone simply cannot ensure that the Postmaster 
General will consistently resolve disputes arising out of a systematic fail-
ure to provide "reasonable accommodations" to carriers injured on the 
job.224 
Agencies thus have, with modest success, adopted informal tech-
niques in response to system-wide disputes that otherwise would overtax 
traditional, individualized adjudication. But each tool has shortcomings. 
Managerial control promotes coordination at the expense of transpar-
ency and judicial independence. Agency-based "test cases" may improve 
information and consistency, but at the expense of formal procedures 
designed to improve legal access. ADR conserves resources and promotes 
other forms of private resolution, but lacks controls to balance power 
differences, ensure consistent outcomes, or promote transparent, bind-
ing results. 
221. See Tonya M. Scherer, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Tax Arena: 
The Internal Revenue SeiVice Opens Its Doors to Mediation, 1997 J. Disp. Resol. 215, 216 
(describing tax disputes and resolution process); Amy S. Wei, Can Mediation Be the An-
swer to Taxpayers' Woes?: An Examination of the Internal Revenue SeiVice's Mediation 
Program, 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 549, 550-51 (2000) (discussing IRS's structure for 
mediation). 
222. Phyllis E. Bernard, Mediating with an 800-Pound Gorilla: Medicare and ADR, 60 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1417, 1428-31 (2003) (explaining that most patients lack financial or 
emotional resources to support prolonged litigation); see also Robert Pear, Bush Pushes 
Plan to Curb Medicare Appeals, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2003, at Al (describing protests 
against proposed legislation that would steer Medicare reviews toward ADR). 
223. See Gregory P. Mathews, Using Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration To Re-
solve IRS-Taxpayer Disputes, 19 Ohio St.J. on Disp. Resol. 709, 724 n.97 (2004) (obseiVing 
that while individual taxpayers with small claims are like class action litigants because 
claims are too small to hire legal representation, "the IRS will not necessarily make a simi-
lar economic calculation ... [and] may vigorously pursue a [small] claim merely for its 
potential precedential value"). 
224. See, e.g., McConnell v. Potter, Appeal No. 0270080054, 2010 WL 332083, at *7 
(EEOC Jan. 14, 2010) (certifYing class of postal employees who alleged failure to provide 
"reasonable accommodations" under 1973 Rehabilitation Act). 
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Ill. THE AGENCY CLASS ACTION 
By adopting aggregate procedures, agencies can fulfill the goals of 
access, efficiency, and consistency for groups more effectively than they 
can by employing the procedures examined above. Unlike the adminis-
trative state, the federal judiciary has long used class actions and coordi-
nated litigation techniques to manage large group-wide harms more effi-
ciently,225 uniformly,226 and equitably227 than is possible through individ-
uallitigation.228 Class actions allow a small group of actors-usually plain-
tiffs' class counsel-to represent multiple parties with common claims in 
federal and state courts, as well as in privately negotiated settlements sub-
ject to judicial oversight.229 Multidistrict litigation also allows attorneys to 
coordinate claims for large groups of plaintiffs before trial, but without 
the res judicata effect of a class action judgment. In multidistrict litiga-
tion, unlike in a class action, every litigant technically retains separate 
counsel; nevertheless, in multidistrict litigation, a special panel may cen-
tralize thousands of individual lawsuits in a single court in the interest of 
streamlining discovery, sharing expert evidence and work product, and 
expediting otherwise massive litigation. 
To date, there have been only scattered efforts to use class-wide pro-
cedures in administrative adjudication in the United States.230 The Equal 
225. See, e.g., Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 659 (1983) (describing "effi-
ciency and economy of litigation" as some of the "principal purpose [s]" of Rule 23); see 
also ALI Report, supra note 37, § 1.03 cmt. b ("All forms of aggregation have efficiency as 
a goal."). 
226. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (I) (A) advisory committee's note ("Actions by or 
against a class provide a ready and fair means of achieving unitary adjudication."). 
227. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (observing that Rule 
23(b) (3) "encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of 
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situ-
ated, without sacrificing procedural fairness"). 
228. Group litigation in federal court dates back to medieval England. See Yeazell, 
supra note 10, at 268-69 (describing evolution of Anglo-American group litigation); 
Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170-73 (1970) (discussing function of 
class actions in judicial system). 
229. Cf. Richards v. jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (finding judgment 
binding on trustee will also bind beneficiaries of trust); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 
n.2 (1989) (recognizing due process requires nonparties in class action be "adequately 
represented by someone with the same interests who is a party"). 
230. In contrast, many common law countries like Great Britain, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand empower designated government bodies to convene "public inquiries" 
for allegations of massive and diffuse harm. "Public inquiries" look a lot like class actions-
retaining the same powers to compel mass discovery, witnesses, and public access-but 
otherwise rest entirely within the executive branch. In Canada, between 1867 and 1977, at 
least 400 commissions convened pursuant to Part 1 of Canada's Federal Inquiries Act. 
Helen Grant, Participation Rights of Witnesses Before a Commission of Inquiry, 18 Can.J. 
Admin. L. & Prac. 89, 90 & n.3 (2005). In Australia, between the time that self-government 
was established in the nineteenth century and 1990, there were approximately 3,500 in-
quiries conducted. D.H. Borchardt, Commissions of Inquiry in Australia: A Brief Survey 
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), for example, created a 
detailed administrative class action procedure for resolving "pattern and 
practice" claims of discrimination by federal employees, including hear-
ings before specialized ALJs and appeals to the EEOC itself.231 The EEOC 
deems the process indispensable in light of the volume of claims it pro-
cesses each year, the potential for inefficient and inconsistent judgments, 
and the claimants' otherwise limited access to counsel.232 No similar pro-
cedure, however, exists for private employees. Nor does any other federal 
agency permit class actions in adjudication, although they have been 
considered in specific contexts.233 
Accordingly, Part liLA below briefly explains how class actions and 
other aggregate procedures may better fulfill the foundational goals of 
access, efficiency, and consistency. Part III.B then sets out a broad pro-
posal for adopting aggregate proceedings in administrative adjudication. 
Part III.C responds to common concerns about the feasibility, legitimacy, 
dependability, and accuracy of large scale litigation in the context of 
agency adjudication. Finally, Part III.D suggests how aggregated adminis-
trative proceedings can also enhance agency control over policymaking 
through adjudication. 
A. The Power and Pitfalls of Aggregate Litigation 
Aggregate procedures seek to provide more access, efficiency, and 
consistency than individualized litigation. Aggregate litigation in federal 
and state courts has long sought to provide more legal access by enabling 
the resolution of claims that otherwise would not be brought individu-
42-43 (1991). Between 1947 and 1971, seventy-seven royal commissions or commissions of 
inquiry were appointed in New Zealand. EJ. Haughey & EJ.L. Fairway, Royal Commis-
sions and Commissions oflnquiry 80-86 (1974). 
231. See Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.204 
(2012). After an employee files a class complaint, the EEOC assigns the complaint to an 
AIJ. Id. § 1614.204(d). The ALJ then decides whether to recommend certification of the 
class, which he or she may do if the proposed class meets the requirements of numerosity, 
commonality, and typicality, and if the complainant who is the proposed agent for the 
class will "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Id. § 1614.204(a)(2), 
(d) (2). If the class agent or any member who has filed a claim for individual relief is unsat-
isfied with the final action of the agency, he or she may either appeal to the EEOC or file a 
civil action in federal court. ld. §§ 1614.401(c), 1614.407. 
232. See, e.g., Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 
37,651 (July 12, 1999) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614) (observing that class actions "are an 
essential mechanism for attacking broad pattems of workplace discrimination and provid-
ing relief to victims of discriminatory policies or systemic practices"); Federal Sector Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,634, 12,639 (Apr. 10, 1992) (codified at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1614) (describing inconsistent judgments resulting from absence of employer 
class actions). 
233. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing rejected class action pro-
posal for CFTC reparation proceedings). 
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ally.234 Aggregate procedures are thought to enable litigation when dam-
ages are too small for individuals to justifY the high costs of retaining 
counsel.235 In cases involving large damages, aggregation also provides 
more access by granting plaintiffs the same "economies of scale" as well-
financed defendants.236 Multidistrict litigation also streamlines large-scale 
litigation, while encouraging parties to participate, through bellwether 
trials, steering committees of plaintiffs that collect and manage claimant 
input, and judicial oversight of attorney conduct.237 These procedures 
hold defendants accountable for wide and diffuse harms that are too 
costly to be prosecuted through individual litigation. 238 In so doing, ag-
gregate procedures, at least theoretically, serve an important democratic 
234. David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Col-
lective Means, 62 Ind. LJ. 561, 564 (1987) (observing that cost of individual, case-by-case 
adjudication "exclude[s] many mass tort victims from the system and sharply reduce[s] 
recovery for those who gain access"); ALI Report, supra note 37, § 1.04 (describing central 
objective of aggregate proceedings as "enabling claimants to voice their concerns and 
facilitating the rendition of further relief that protects the rights of affected persons"). But 
see, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & John F. Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An 
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1571, 1618 (2004) (observ-
ing that for very similar, highly litigated claims, "economies of scale seem to lead to the 
concentration of market share on both the plaintiff and defense sides into a small number 
of repeat actors"). 
235. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("'A class action 
solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something 
worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor."' (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 
109 F.3d 338, 344 {7th Cir. 1997))); Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, supra note 37, at 
1115-17 (describing alternative goals of class action litigation). 
236. See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: 
Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 19, 27-30 (2003) [hereinafter Rosenberg, 
Adding a Second Opt-Out] (arguing for aggregate procedures to allow plaintiffs' counsel 
to make optimal investment in litigation); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: \<\'hat 
Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 Harv.J. on Legis. 393, 397-400 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions] (explaining how aggregating classable claims cre-
ates economies of scale favorable to plaintiffs). 
237. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 10.1 (collecting proce-
dures for judicial management of complex cases and observing that "investing time in the 
early stages of the litigation, however, will lead to earlier dispositions, less wasteful activity, 
shorter trials, and, in the long run, economies of judicial time and fewer judicial bur-
dens"). 
238. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the Peo-
ple: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 174 (2008) (observ-
ing that procedural benefits include substantial reduction in costs of "discovery, retention 
of experts, legal research and legal fees"); see also Thomas E. Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., 
A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group app. Cat 20 (1999) ("Aggregating mass torts 
may provide an opportunity to correct more systematically the harms that products have 
caused .... "); Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions, supra note 236, at 394 ("With class-
wide aggregation of the defense interest, the defendant exploit~ economies of scale to 
invest far more cost-effectively in preparing its side of the case .... "). 
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function, allowing groups of individuals to collectively petition and re-
dress widespread harm.239 
Aggregate procedures are also thought to be more efficient than indi-
vidual litigation for group-wide harm. They eliminate the time and ex-
pense associated with traditional one-on-one adjudication, which other-
wise involves months or years of the "'same witnesses, exhibits and issues 
from trial to trial. "'240 In other words, aggregate procedures provide an 
opportunity to fulfill the compensatory goals of the civil justice system 
"more consistently and completely," and create a "deterrent effect" that 
equals the "magnitude of the harm."241 
Finally, aggregate procedures seek more uniform application of law. 
Although aggregate procedures try to ensure that outcomes reflect the 
individual claims and interests of the different participants,242 aggregate 
proceedings and settlements fundamentally seek uniformity and distribu-
tive fairness-to treat like parties in a like manner.243 Otherwise, in cases 
involving group-wide harm, the first claimants to bring lawsuits might 
receive astronomical awards, while other victims receive nothing. And, in 
cases seeking injunctions or declaratory relief, a court may never hear 
from plaintiffs with competing interests in the final outcome, or, over 
time, subject defendants to impossibly conflicting demands. 
Nevertheless, large cases create new risks. The sheer number of 
claims in aggregate litigation threatens legal access, efficiency, and con-
sistency by (1) stretching courts' capacity to administer justice to many 
people; (2) replacing individual hearings with a potentially faceless, un-
responsive bureaucracy; (3) relying upon representatives tempted by the 
promise of large fees or power; and (4) increasing the consequence of 
239. See Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within 
the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 296, 382 (1996) 
(summarizing democratic theories involving access to litigation). 
240. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (granting cer-
tification of class action involving asbestos). See generally Weinstein, Individual Justice, 
supra note 35, at 136 (noting economies of scale reduce discovery costs and expert fees in 
class actions); William Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order out of 
Chaos, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 837, 837-38 (1995) (explaining how class actions are seen as 
remedy to duplicative litigation activity). 
241. Willging, supra note 238, at 20. 
242. See Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 Ohio 
St. L:J. 1, 42-46 (1993) (articulating a "mixed-model" of fairness that balances need to 
maximize total recovery for class against need to ensure settlement does not unfairly ex-
clude individual members of class). 
243. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) (B) (describing potential of individual adjudications 
to substantially impair or impede future claimants' "ability to protect their interests"); 
Arthur R. Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present and Future, 4 Just. 
Sys.J. 197, 211 (1978) (discussing need to convert individual cases into class action to eq-
uitably distribute limited resources of defense). 
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error in high-stakes litigation.244 In other words, just like many kinds of 
administrative systems, aggregate litigation struggles to govern many dif-
ferent kinds of constituencies feasibly, legitimately, loyally, and accu-
rately. 
First, aggregate litigation may become unfeasible, if not properly 
managed, by imposing cumbersome new costs on adjudication. In aggre-
gate litigation, courts may expend resources to retain special masters, 
establish expert panels, set up large discovery banks, and screen volumi-
nous filings. Litigation expenses may also increase when both parties be-
lieve that there is more at stake to lose, causing some to suggest that class 
litigation creates "diseconomies of scale."245 Problems of administrative 
feasibility mean that courts must try to determine whether methods less 
drastic than aggregation, like voluntary coordination of discovery OT bet-
ter pretrial processing, can achieve the same benefits of class actions or 
multidistrict litigation at a lower cost. 246 
Second, aggregate litigation threatens legitimacy by replacing formal 
court hearings with impersonal, top-down bureaucracies that stray from 
democratic ideals.247 As judges, lawyers, and special masters together 
oversee the difficult task of identifying and categorizing people accord-
ing to their losses, they limit the individual satisfaction many derive from 
244. See, e.g., ALI Report, supra note 37, §§ 1.03 cmt. c, 2.02 cmt. c (observing that 
aggregation should respect "institutional capacity of the courts," protect interests of "rep-
resented persons" as well as their "rights" delineated by law, and enable "binding resolu-
tions" to all claimants); see also Erbsen, supra note 38, at 1024 (proposing new principles 
to mitigate distortions caused by class actions); Lahav, Numbers, supra note 32, at 429 
("Courts should foster a form of administration that allows access to justice, and at the 
same time is humanizing, thoughtful and deliberative."). 
245. Compare Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Criti-
cal Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10.J.L. & Com. 1, 15-16 (1990) (arguing consolidation 
may not be very efficient), and Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: 
Constitutional and Practical Advantages of the State Forum over the Federal Forum in 
Mass Tort Cases, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 215, 254-55 (1994) (describing potential for 
diseconomies of scale when efficiency is "pursued too far"), with Richard B. Stewart & Cass 
R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1196, 1199, 1298 
(1982) (describing "diseconomies of scale" in agency proceedings "given multiple layers of 
decision and review and the temptation to adopt overly rigid norms in order to reduce 
administrative costs"). 
246. See ALI Report, supra note 37, § 2.02 cmt. b (observing that courts should con-
sider "realistic procedural alternatives" to aggregation and degree to which they also "ad-
vance the resolution" of common claims). 
247. Compare, e.g., Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociol-
ogy 196, 216 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) ("[T]he more the bureau-
cracy is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official busi-
ness love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape 
calculation."), with Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 
1183, 1198 (1982) ("Respect for individual dignity, autonomy, and self-expression de-
mands that those with rights directly at risk have an adequate means of registering their 
concerns."). 
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receiving their "day in court."248 For others, the large class action trans-
forms the judge from an independent neutral into an interested "man-
ager," creating "opportunities for judges to use-or abuse-their 
power."249 
Third, aggregate litigation risks disloyalty. Defense counsel may forge 
collusive or sweetheart deals with plaintiffs' counsel, despite their clients' 
best interests.250 Participants in a class settlement also lack rational incen-
tives to monitor class counsel because they have a comparatively small 
stake in the entire enterprise.251 
Finally, aggregate litigation threatens accuracy by "averaging" claim 
values among parties with different injuries or by favoring the interests of 
some plaintiffs over others. Because class actions bind large groups of 
people in the same way, the accuracy of the decisions becomes even 
more important than in an individual case. The efficiency with which 
class actions resolve disputes puts pressure on the ability of the court to 
achieve accurate decisions in individual cases. 
In sum, aggregate litigation seeks the same fundamental goals of ac-
cess, efficiency, and consistency as administrative law. But, also like 
248. See Willging, supra note 238, at 18 (observing that large setdements involving 
mass torts "make it more likely that individual cases will be disposed of without trial or 
hearing, raising questions of procedural unfairness in terms of satisfYing litigant interests 
in participating meaningfully in resolving their cases"); Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological 
Perspective on the Setdement of Mass Tort Claims, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 199, 204 
(1990) ("[H]aving one's day in court often leads to a more satisfactory claiming experi-
ence than does a swift procedure in which litigants are minimally involved."); Patricia M. 
Wald, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 Yale LJ 1478, 1483 (1983) (arguing "personalized 
judiciary" is endangered by growth of bureaucracy in court system). 
249. Judith Resnik, Managerialjudges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374,425 (1982). 
250. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883-89 (1987) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Regulation] (describing "conflicts of interest between attorney and 
client ... in class action litigation"); Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions 
(May) Settle for Too Little, 48 Hastings LJ. 479, 479 (1997) (articulating concerns class 
counsel may "sell out" and settle for less than reasonably possible); see also In re Oracle 
Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 645 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("Class counsel's fee application is pre-
sented to the court with the enthusiastic endorsement, or at least acquiescence, of the 
lawyers on both sides of the litigation, a situation virtually designed to conceal any prob-
lems with the settlement not in the interests of the lawyers to disclose."). 
251. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Prob-
lems and Class Action Settlements, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 71, 81 (2007) ("[B]ecause some class 
action litigation is premised on the need to aggregate claims that are too small to litigate 
individually, no class member may have enough at stake to expend personal resources on 
monitoring the class counsel."). Others observe that attorneys' incentives to obtain fair 
outcomes for their clients may be affected by the fact that they can earn large attorneys' 
fees by settling. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 469, 503 (1994) [hereinafter Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas] (comparing 
attorney's financial stake to that of "any single litigant" and noting attorney has "substan-
tial incentive to reach a settlement and collect a contingency fee sooner rather than 
later"). 
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administrative law, mass dispute resolution may impose unanticipated 
costs and delays, threaten the legitimacy of individualized access to gov-
ernment, risk creating new conflicts of interest, and increase the im-
portance of accurate outcomes. Thus, any proposal for agency aggrega-
tion of administrative proceedings must incorporate tools that can take 
advantage of the benefits of aggregation while minimizing the potential 
dangers. 
With this in mind, Part III.B describes the proposal. Part III.C then 
responds to potential concerns of feasibility, legitimacy, loyalty, and ac-
curacy. 
B. The Proposal 
The "agency class action" is, in fact, shorthand for three kinds of ag-
gregate proceedings. Under the proposal, parties could petition a panel 
within the agency for an "aggregate proceeding" that would (1) coordi-
nate related claims before any trial-like administrative hearing com-
mences, (2) provide class-wide relief to similarly situated parties through 
an administrative proceeding, or (3) aggregate claims for settlement 
purposes. As set forth below, the rules for pretrial consolidation, class 
certification, and aggregate settlement would roughly trace the federal 
rules that govern multidistrict litigation and complex class actions. 
1. Prehearing Coordination or Consolidation.- To coordinate proceed-
ings before an administrative hearing, any party-plaintiffs, defendants, 
or even the enforcement arm of the agency itself-would first petition a 
panel within the agency to make a threshold decision: that common is-
sues of law or fact require "coordinated or consolidated" prehearing pro-
ceedings. For example, veterans who drank contaminated water at the 
same military base,252 or lost their hearing while in the same military oc-
cupational specialty,253 could petition the VA to coordinate prehearing 
proceedings to handle common discovery issues.254 Similarly, miners 
252. Lena H. Sun, Survey Seeks Data on Camp Lejeune Illnesses, Wash. Post, june 27, 
2011, at A15 ("As many as 1 million people over three decades may have been exposed to 
well water that was contaminated by toxins .... Some of the toxins may have been present 
at levels as much as 40 times the current safety standards."). 
253. Gregg Zoroya, Soldier's Story Shows Risks of Hearing Loss, USA Today, Aug. 4, 
2008, at lA ("One in four soldiers serving in Iraq or Afghanistan have damaged hearing 
.... "). 
254. Under the Department's organic statute and regulations, veterans may only 
challenge problems in proceedings before the agency. See 38 U.S.C. § 511 (a) (2006) 
(granting Secretary final and conclusive power to decide questions of law and fact re-
quired to make decisions affecting provision of veterans' benefits); 38 C.F.R. § 20.3(e) 
(2011) (defining "benefit"); see also S. Rep. No. 111-265, at 35-36 (2009) (statement of 
Professor Michael P. Allen) (describing unfairness that result~ because Veteran Court's 
jurisdiction is "limited to cases in which a veteran challenged a specific, individual Board 
decision" and because, before reaching Veteran's Court, veterans must participate in 
"non-adversarial" process where they effectively lack counsel). Veterans must file separate 
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filing claims against the same mine operator under the Black Lung 
Benefits Program for exposure to coal dust might seek coordination to 
ameliorate the resource imbalances they face in litigation with mine 
owners, providing injured miners with shared resources and the where-
withal to invest in better trained experts. Like in multidistrict litigation, 
the parties could file their petition after a threshold number of people 
file common claims.255 The administrative panel would determine 
whether to centralize claims by considering (1) whether coordination 
would avoid duplication of discovery, (2) whether it would prevent in-
consistent evidentiary or other prehearing rulings, and (3) whether it 
would conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the 
agency.256 In coordinated proceedings, no representative plaintiff acts on 
behalf of others. The agency simply aggregates individual cases into a 
single forum for the sake of convenience and efficiency. 
Assuming the petitioner meets the threshold requirements for a 
"coordinated" action, the agency would then appoint a "transferee" ad-
ministrative law judge from a specialized core of adjudicators responsible 
for, and experienced in, complex aggregated proceedings, such as judges 
and arbitrators appointed in complex arbitration and multidistrict litiga-
tion.257 Among other things, the specialized ALJ would require parties to 
jointly file a case management order (CMO), which would streamline 
management of discovery, including expert reports and depositions of 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to obtain overlapping discovery and litigate 
separate appeals and remands involving the same claim for delay without the aid of coun-
sel. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The 
veteran's only way to independently learn the outcome of an external review is to file re-
quest under the Freedom of Information Act."), vacated en bane, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
255. Those advocating transfer bear a higher burden of persuasion when there are 
only a small number of actions. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 20.131; 
see also Leahy v. Lone Mountain Aviation, Inc. (In re Air Crash at Las Vegas, Nev., on Aug. 
28, 2008), 716 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (denying centralization and citing 
"minimal number of actions and parties ... involved"). Subsequently filed cases raising the 
same common factual question, also known as "tag-along" cases, are also automatically 
centralized before the same ALJ. See, e.g., J.P.M.L. Rule 7.2(a) ("Potential tag-along ac-
tions filed in the transferee district do not require Panel action."). 
256. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (allowing actions with common questions offact 
to be transferred for convenience and efficiency); Manual for Complex Litigation, supra 
note 81, § 20.13--.131 ("The objective of transfer is to eliminate duplication in discovery, 
avoid conflicting rulings and schedules, reduce litigation cost, and save the time and effort 
of the parties, the attorneys, the witnesses, and the courts." (citing In re Plumbing Fixture 
Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (J.P.M.L. 1968))). 
257. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 20.131 (considering "ex-
perience" and "skill" of available judges for designation); Brief of American Arbitration 
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 13, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimaiFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198) (noting "arbitrators presid-
ing over class arbitrations conducted under the Rules are appointed from a select national 
roster of experienced class action arbitrators"). 
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common wiUlesses, and scheduling of overlapping motions, as well as 
other common issues.258 A joint plaintiffs' steering committee could coor-
dinate scheduling, take responsibility for providing claimants with indi-
vidual counsel, and share costs and expenses, including fees to pay for 
scientists and other experts, with a mechanism to split attorneys' fees. 
Coordinating claims in this way allows plaintiffs to pool their limited re-
sources to introduce similar kinds of proof, and rely upon similar scien-
tific testimony. 
2. Class Actions and Quasi-Class Actions. - At any time, the parties 
could also petition for a class action.259 The ALJ would carefully consider 
whether or not to certify a class action based on the same factors de-
scribed in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including 
whether the members of the proposed class are sufficiently numerous, 
whether common questions of fact or law exist, whether the claims of the 
class representatives are typical, and whether the class representatives 
and their counsel are adequate to represent the class.260 In addition to 
these baseline requirements, the ALJ must also determine that the class 
action is superior to individual adjudication. The ALJ might consider (1) 
whether individual relief would impair the ability of other class members 
to recover, such as where there is a limited fund available;261 (2) whether 
the class members are all challenging the same behavior of one or more 
parties, such as the government;262 or (3) whether common issues pre-
dominate over individual ones and a class action is the most efficient and 
fairest method of resolving the cases. 263 For example, the ALJ could cer-
tify classes where parties seek declaratory relief about a common ques-
tion, such as whether the Black Lung Benefits Program covers a particu-
lar lung disease, or whether a particular "stressor" is sufficient to support 
a veteran's claim for benefits based on PTSD. In addition, class certifica-
tion would be appropriate to address disputes arising out of a common 
question of fact, like a group of veterans who were all wrongfully denied 
258. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 20.132 (advising that 
judges deem rulings on some limited but common issues, like statutes of limitations, to 
apply to other cases and make discovery already taken available to newly filed cases to 
streamline cases). 
259. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (describing rules for class action certification). 
260. See id. 23(a) (setting forth criteria required for all class actions). 
261. See id. 23(b)(1)(B) (providing that if adjudications for individual claimants 
would impair ability of nonparties to protect their interests, it would be partial grounds for 
class certification). 
262. See id. 23(b) (2) (requiring that party opposing proposed class has acted in way 
that applies generally to class as whole). 
263. See id. 23(b) (3) (requiring court to find that questions of law or fact common 
to class members predominate over individual questions and that class action is fairest and 
most efficient way to adjudicate controversy). 
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treatment for PTSD at the same outpatient facility,264 or an automated 
error in the calculation of food stamps, Medicaid, or other public bene-
fits. 265 
When the agency or claimants collectively seek compensation from 
insolvent defendants or those with "limited funds," the ALJ would certify 
a mandatory class action, like those described under 23(b)(l) and (2) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to determine how the fund should 
be allocated. Such class certification would be appropriate in agency res-
titution cases, where individual investors, consumers, or homeowners 
must be compensated from a limited settlement fund. As set forth in Part 
I, no existing process permits agencies to resolve disputes between dif-
ferent classes of victims. Under a limited fund class action procedure, 
however, the agency could organize different interests into subclasses of 
investors, ensure each class has separate and adequate representation, 
and notify absent parties based on shareholder records. Mter receiving 
their comments or objections, the ALJ would determine the categories of 
people entitled to relief, the amount of that relief, and any evidence re-
quired to establish their entitlement to that relief. 
Similarly, agencies could resolve public rights litigation through in-
junctive or declaratory relief class actions, like those under Rule 
23 (b) (2). Such a rule is particularly appropriate for cases involving im-
migration, Social Security, veterans' claims, and other public benefits.26fi 
Unlike class actions for compensation, which may result in a settlement 
fund overseen by a private administrator to distribute benefits, an injunc-
tion could force an already existing administrative structure, like the 
Social Security Administration, to disburse benefits consistent with the 
class-wide relief. 
Finally, many private rights cases seeking money damages as well as 
public rights cases involving monetary benefits could be resolved 
264. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(addressing plaintiffs' claim alleging that almost all veteran outpatient offices lacked 
trained staff members capable of diagnosing veterans with PTSD in violation of federal law 
and Veterans Administration's own guidelines), vacated en bane, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
265. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
1249, 1256-58 (describing routine, automated mistakes by state and federal agencies in 
food stamps, Medicaid, and welfare eligibility determinations); Leslie Kaufman, A Bounty 
of Food Stamps, Harvested from a Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2008, at A31 (describing 
class action settlement for 9,500 class members illegally denied food stamps). 
266. As a practical matter, public rights claims would not involve the kind of class-
wide determinations of compensatory relief that the Supreme Court rejected in Wai-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (denying class certification in part be-
cause certification would create perverse incentive of discouraging potentially valid claims 
for compensatory damages). And even when the claim involves compensation, like chal-
lenges to the routine denial of benefits, injunctive relief may materially advance the litiga-
tion. 
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through "voluntary" class actions like those under Rule 23(b) (3) or 
"quasi-class actions." Such cases could include compensation when par-
ties are subject to a common fraud, like a commonly assessed overcharge 
in the marketplace, or the routine denial or erroneous calculation of 
benefits. 267 
Some cases seeking compensatory relief, however, may present too 
many individual questions. In the Black Lung cases, for example, issues 
such as the timing and duration of exposure and evidence of specific 
causation may make class-wide procedures difficult. In cases where indi-
vidual issues overwhelm common issues, groups could still rely on two 
other tools derived from "limited issue" class actions and multidistrict 
litigation to coordinate adjudication. Under the Federal Rules, parties 
may certify a class action for a specific issue or element of their claims 
when the parties raise a common issue of law or fact. 268 These "issue class 
actions" allow parties to achieve the economies of class actions for a part 
of the case-like whether a defendant lied to investors,269 whether 
Somalia is an appropriate destination for deportation,270 or whether a 
military job in a particular theater and time period was likely to result in 
noise exposures sufficient to damage hearing271-even if courts could not 
manageably try the remaining individual issues of causation and damages 
as a class. 272 
In cases that do not qualify for an issue class action, parties could 
still use rules from multidistrict litigation to ensure more efficiency, con-
sistency, and participation than in individual adjudications.273 At a 
267. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 265 (describing settlement in which 9,500 class 
members illegally denied food stamps were automatically credited $12 million through use 
of electronic benefit cards). 
268. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4). 
269. See Biben v. Card, 789 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (W.O. Mo. 1992) (splitting trial into 
class-wide liability phase for alleged shareholder fraud and individual damage phase). 
270. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2003) (challenging governmental 
practice of deportation to Somalia absent functioning government), withdrawn, 421 F.3d 
795 (9th Cir. 2005). 
271. Zoroya, supra note 253 (noting "[o]ne in four soldiers serving in Iraq or 
Mghanistan have damaged hearing"). 
272. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 21.24. Agencies should only 
grant limited issue classes, however, when they "materially advance" the disposition of the 
case. That is, they should avoid certifying limited issue classes when the final resolution 
would still leave open a large number of issues that require individual determinations. See 
id. § 21.24 nn.835-839 (collecting cases granting and denying limited issue class actions). 
273. Some have even characterized coordinated proceedings as "quasi-class actions." 
See Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 251, at 480-81 (referring to mass consolida-
tions as "quasi-class actions" because "(o]bligations to claimants, defendants, and the pub-
lic remain much the same"); see also Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class 
Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 Vand. 
L. Rev. 107, 110-11 (2010) (describing multi-district litigations as "quasi-class actions" 
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minimum, coordinated litigation would aim to ensure that certain cate-
gories of claimants raising fact-intensive issues receive consistent and ex-
pedited treatment before the agency. Among other things, administrative 
adjudicators could do so by encouraging parties to select "lead" or "bell-
wether" cases that presumptively apply to subsequent similar cases, by 
convening joint telephonic conferences and establishing joint orders, 
and by appointing common experts, special masters, and counsel to 
avoid duplication.274 
3. Aggregate Settlement.- Finally, when the parties are able to reach a 
settlement, they could jointly petition the ALJ to approve the settlement 
as "fair, reasonable and adequate."275 The federal class action exerts pres-
sure on many defendants to settle in order to avoid large losses.276 The 
same pressure may induce parties to settle in private rights litigation 
where significant money damages are at stake. Therefore, an agency 
would need to adopt rules to ensure that counsel and other representa-
tives fairly represent the interests of the parties in settlement, similar to 
Article III judges who review attorney representatives for potential con-
flicts of interest. 277 To do so, as in civil litigation, ALJs may require coun-
sel, mediators, or experts in the litigation to explain their decisions, 278 
because "a judge presiding over an MDL enjoys the same broad equitable powers as a 
judge presiding over a class action"). 
274. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 20.14 (identifying options 
for coordinating related cases); Joan A. Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on 
the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be (pt. 2), 42 UCLA 
L. Rev. 967, 971-78 (1995) (arguing consolidated litigation is representative in practice 
and discussing merits of appointing lead counsel); see also ALI Report, supra note 37, 
§ 1.02 cmt. b(2) (discussing coordination of separate lawsuits in various types of adminis-
trative aggregations, including bellwether trials). 
275. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (2). Federal courts have developed a common set offactors 
to consider, which include ( 1) likelihood of recovery, or likelihood of success; (2) amount 
and nature of discovery or evidence; (3) settlement terms and conditions; (4) recommen-
dation and experience of counsel; (5) future expense and likely duration of litigation; 
(6) recommendation of neutral parties, if any; (7) the number of objectors and nature of 
objections; and (8) the presence of good faith and the absence of collusion. 4 Alba Conte 
& Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions§ 11:43 (4th ed. 2002). 
276. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting 
threat of huge liability in class actions often creates "intense pressure to settle"); Richard 
A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbi-
tration, and CAFA, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1872, 1879-82 (2006) (describing theory behind 
pressure to settle) . 
277. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 21.612 & n.965 (collecting 
cases supporting argument that "[c]lass actions certified solely for settlement ... some-
times make meaningful judicial review more difficult and more important"). 
278. See, e.g., Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996) (scrutinizing counsels' 
conception of plaintiffs' chances of success at trial and approving of district court's con-
sideration that settlement was fair); Murillo v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 921 F. Supp. 443, 445 
(S.D. Tex. 1996) (requiring counsel to engage in "sufficient discovery"); Manual for Com-
plex Litigation, supra note 81, § 21.612 & n.965 (collecting cases where courts apply 
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paying particular attention if mass settlements award more to some class 
members at the expense of others or are reached before the parties have 
tested the theories of the case through discovery.279 
Individuals would have opportunities to object (in writing or, if fea-
sible, in person) at a fairness hearing to determine the final distribution 
of the award. At the same fairness hearing, the ALJ could hear from rep-
resentative counsel for different subclasses with interests in the total 
award, such as creditors, institutional investors, and small investors, in a 
"limited fund" class action. Finally, the ALJ would approve the categories 
of people entitled to relief and the amount of relief sought by the par-
ties. 
The government may feel less pressure to settle in public rights 
cases. When the agency itself stands in the shoes of the defendant and 
the claims do not involve money damages against the government, the 
agency will not face the same risk of loss. Agencies may even welcome 
aggregation more than typical defendants because the agency head can 
generally reverse an ALJ's ruling that is at odds with the agency's mission. 
In addition, while ALJs enjoy some protections, they do not enjoy the 
lifetime tenure or institutional authority of Article III judges.280 There-
fore, they may be less willing to second guess the agency head's decision 
about what would be a fair and appropriate settlement. 
Still, agencies often face the prospect of federal judicial review, so 
this may temper their enthusiasm for sweeping decisions that a federal 
court might reverse.281 Moreover, agencies do often settle individual 
"closer judicial scrutiny" for potential conflicts of interest, particularly when there has 
been "little or no discovery" to test strengths and weaknesses of each party's position). 
279. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (observing 
certification of settlement class requires "undiluted, even heightened, attention"); Synfuel 
Tech., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 652-54 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding 
that district court failed to adequately evaluate fairness of settlement); Mirfasihi v. Fleet 
Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting settlement when certain class 
members were settled for no consideration without reasoned explanation); see also John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation Mter Amchem Products-or, Why Attorneys 
Still Need Consent To Give Away Their Clients' Money, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1541, 1545 (1998) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Conflicts] (observing occasions where class counsel will have no in-
centive to "resist an allocation plan favored by the defendant, who often has an interest in 
preferring one subgroup within the class over another"). 
280. Compare U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 ('Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive 
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office."), with 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2006) (limiting ex parte communications with 
administrative law judges), id. § 5372 (prescribing pay decisions for administrative law 
judges), and id. § 7521 (providing separate adjudicatory proceeding to determine whether 
"good cause" exists for terminating administrative law judge). 
281. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 939, 940-42 (2011) 
(describing and critiquing modem American system of judicial review of agency proceed-
ings). 
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public rights cases when it is compatible with their mission.282 The agency 
might be more willing to settle in the context of an agency class action 
than a federal court action because many agency adjudications are less 
adversarial and agencies exert greater control over the process and out-
come. 
4. Appeal. -Finally, like in federal court, class members could ap-
peal a final judgment made during the course of a coordinated proceed-
ing, class action, or class settlement to the final Article I tribunal-often 
the head of the agency-and ultimately to federal court. The advantages 
of aggregation will continue to bear fruit on appeal. First, because the 
decision below will affect large groups of individuals and entities in 
agency proceedings, it will be worthwhile and possible for the agency to 
devote more time and attention to the appeal. Second, for the same rea-
sons, the agency's decision on appeal is likely to be more transparent 
than final decisions in individual adjudications, which rarely attract much 
public attention. Third, because of the more developed and coordinated 
discovery below, the appellate body will be presented with a fuller record 
on which to consider the systemic aspects of the issue. 
Appeals from aggregated proceedings give agencies more opportu-
nities to resolve systemic problems before they get to federal court. 
Courts will also benefit from a better record on appeal. Once more, the 
court may more precisely address the agency's own regulations and gov-
erning statute-rather than remanding the action with a potentially 
vague instruction that the agency design new and improved procedures. 
C. Ensuring Feasibility, Legitimacy, Layalty, and Accuracy 
Any large representative adjudication must respond to concerns, 
outlined above in Part liLA, about feasibility, legitimacy, loyalty, and ac-
curacy. Best practices in class actions and other aggregate litigation have 
long tried to (1) make aggregate litigation feasible with threshold re-
quirements to screen out those cases better suited for individual adjudi-
cation and to streamline those that are not;283 (2) make aggregate litiga-
tion legitimate through safeguards designed to create an impartial forum 
capable of hearing and resolving claimants' concerns;284 (3) make aggre-
gate litigation layal to absent class members through internal monitoring 
282. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The 
Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 Duke LJ. 1015, 1019 (2001) ("[I]t is now 
commonplace for an agency to offer the opportunity for mediation and settlement to 
parties to an adjudication .... "). 
283. See infra Part III.C.l (discussing some problems with aggregate litigation and 
how threshold requirements would make aggregate litigation more feasible). 
284. See infra Part III.C.2 (noting potential for abuse of power and suggesting meth-
ods to improve legitimacy of aggregate litigation). 
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and judicial review;285 and ( 4) make aggregate litigation accurately reflect 
the underlying merits of plaintiffs' claims, through minitrials, statistical 
extrapolation, and other methods.286 
Accordingly, agencies considering the adoption of complex litiga-
tion procedures must take similar steps to ensure feasible, legitimate, 
loyal, and accurate decisions in mass adjudication. This section describes 
how agencies may begin to address those concerns. 
1. Feasible Decisionmaking. - In many ways, aggregate procedures al-
ready make large adjudications more feasible by streamlining claims,287 
coordinating discovery, utilizing probabilistic or statistical evidence,288 
and binding parties to final resolutions, fairly and equitably. Expending 
some resources to encourage more parties to participate in a single pro-
ceeding should save costs in the end. Moreover, when sophisticated 
stakeholders participate in adjudications, they will improve accurate case 
handling and reduce the rate of reversal on appeal. All of these proce-
dures make aggregate agency adjudication more feasible than processing 
common cases individually. 
But aggregate procedures also impose new costs. Procedures for in-
dividualized notice, fairness hearings, as well as set asides for attorney 
expenses could add strain to already beleaguered agencies. In addition, 
some argue that class actions add new "process costs"-that is, by lower-
ing the costs of filing claims, they increase their volume, which demands 
new people to screen out fraudulent claims.289 Finally, agency class ac-
tions create opportunity costs. Devoting a special core of administrative 
judges to handle class actions or other aggregate claims may divert 
285. See infra Part III.C.3 (observing potential for disloyalty in aggregate litigation 
and recommending steps to increase loyalty). 
286. See infra Part III.C.4 (discussing danger of "averaging" claim values and meth-
ods that would increase accuracy of aggregate litigation). 
287. See, e.g., Order at 2, In re September 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 17, 2007), available at http:/ /www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/rulings/21MC97_order_ 
091707.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (ordering cases closed due to settle-
ment). 
288. See Schwab v. Philip Morris USA., Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1239-40 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (finding use of statistical evidence to establish liability and damages consistent with 
due process), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 
215 (2d Cir. 2008); Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in 
a World of Process Scarcity, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 561, 650 (1993) (concluding sampling is 
acceptable form of resolving mass tort cases only in instances where individual adjudica-
tion is not feasible because of "process scarcity"); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 
76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 576, 582-89 (2008) [hereinafter Lahav, Bellwether] (describing use 
of statistical extrapolation in cases ranging from asbestos to human rights abuses). 
289. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in 
Mass Torts, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 595, 606 (1997) (observing that "(j]udges who move large 
numbers of highly elastic mass torts through their litigation process at low transaction 
costs create the opportunity for new filings," and "[i]fyou build a superhighway, there will 
be a traffic jam"). 
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resources from other matters, including cases requiring individual 
adjudication. Problems of administrative feasibility mean that courts 
must try to determine whether methods less drastic than aggregation, 
like voluntary coordination of discovery, can achieve the same benefits as 
class actions or multidistrict litigation at a lower cost.290 
Agencies can ensure that aggregate litigation is feasible by adopting 
threshold rules from complex litigation to sort the cases suitable for class 
treatment from those that are not. Courts weigh the comparative benefits 
of individual and collective control over the shape of the litigation, the 
progress of any existing individual litigation, the comparative benefits of 
concentrating litigation in a single forum, and whether the class-wide 
proceeding is manageable and materially advances the resolution of 
those cases.291 Agencies may take into account similar factors. First, to 
determine whether the interest in individual control outweighs the bene-
fits of collective treatment, agencies should begin by evaluating the "vari-
ability" and "marketability" of potential claims.292 A group of claims is 
highly "variable" when the individual claims differ significantly from each 
other. Claims are less "marketable" when they promise small verdicts or 
settlement values. 293 Courts often refuse to certify class actions when 
claims are highly variable.294 
To some extent, agency adjudications will always raise less varied 
questions than adjudications in courts of general jurisdiction; by design, 
agency courts must adjudicate limited sets of issues according to the 
agencies' organic statute or regulations. However, there will still be cases 
where agencies must sort out common claims from highly variable, fact-
290. See ALI Report, supra note 37, § 2.02 cmt. b (observing that courts should con-
sider "realistic procedural alternatives" to aggregation and degree to which they also "drive 
the resolution" of common claims). 
291. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (A)-(D) (describing factors to be considered in 
class certification). 
292. See ALI Report, supra note 37, § 2.02 (laying out general principles for collec-
tive treatment of common issues); Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer 
Claims: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 34 Tex. Int'l LJ. 135, 149 (1999) (summarizing 
effects of variance between claims and value of claims on utility of class actions). 
293. See ALI Report, supra note 37, § 2.02 cmt. b (noting that one concern motivat-
ing aggregation is prospective claimants' inability to obtain individual representation in 
market); see also Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 37, at 516-18 (describing 
application of ALI principles of claim "variability" and claim "viability" to agency settle-
ments); Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 98, at 1437-38 (describing application of claim 
variability and marketability to massive criminal restitution settlements). 
294. See ALI Report, supra note 37, § 2.02 reporters' notes cmt. b ("The strength of 
the justification for class certification in the low-viability and low-variation scenario is well 
recognized in the law of class actions."); see also Issacharoff, supra note 292, at 149 
("Where the uniformity of the defendant's conduct defines the perimeter of the lawsuit, 
and where the individual stake in the case is too low to make private enforcement viable, 
aggregation through a class action is an indispensable mechanism for allowing private 
enforcement of consumer claims."). 
2012] AGENCY CLASS ACTION 2051 
dependent cases. For example, cases involving claims with low variability 
and low marketability, such as consumer cases that only involve small dol-
lar amounts, can generally be resolved effectively by civil class actions. 295 
Conversely, cases that are both highly variable and marketable, like a 
mass tort case, may be resolved more competently through individual or 
coordinated litigation.296 Finally, agency class actions may resolve cases 
involving low variability and highly valuable claims-like many antitrust, 
securities, declaratory relief, and structural reform disputes-because of 
the strong interest in treating like cases in a like manner.297 Such cases, 
however, also may provide parties more chances to participate in the ac-
tion-or to "opt out" of the aggregate adjudication-in light of the 
strong individual interest parties may have in controlling their own fate. 
Second, agencies may also consider the extent to which individual 
litigation has already progressed. Cases involving highly fact-specific is-
sues over one's potential deportation or pending medical treatment may 
not be amenable to class-wide relief where the results of aggregation pro-
long the detention or delay of putative members of the class. 298 On the 
295. Issacharoff, supra note 292, at 149 (collecting examples of "low marketable" 
claims from consumer law). The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue: 
"The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the 
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to 
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this prob-
lem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something 
worth someone's ... labor." 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338,344 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
296. The cases involving the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx provide a good example 
of highly variable and highly marketable claims. Courts rejected a class action because the 
individual circumstances that gave rise to each claim varied substantially. See In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 463 (E.D. La. 2006) (denying class action); Int'l Union 
of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929 A.2d 1076, 1089 (NJ. 
2007) ("[W]e cannot escape the vast differences between [the] appropriate use of the 
class action device and the present inappropriate one."). The high value of each claim, 
however, ensured that the vast majority (if not all) of the plaintiffs were able to initiate 
individual suits against the drug manufacturer through coordinated civil litigation. See 
Silver & Miller, supra note 273, at 138 (observing that over 1,100 law firms participated in 
Vioxx litigation alone). 
297. Securities law class actions, for example, comprised the greatest share of class ac-
tion settlements over the past decade. Almost half of the 5,179 class action claims pending 
in federal court as of September 2004 were securities class actions. Leonidas Ralph 
Mecham, Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts., 2004 Judicial Business: Annual Report of the 
Director 400 tbl.X-4 (2004), available at http:/ /host4.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/ 
appendices/x4.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also John C. Coffee Jr. & 
Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments over the Last Five Years 2002-2007: The 
Future of Class Actions, in Practising Law Inst., Class Action Litigation 2008: Prosecution 
and Defense Strategies 193, 198 (2008) (describing similar trend). This is because those 
kinds of actions tend to involve low variability claims. 
298. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (A) (noting that "class members' interests in in-
dividually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions" may provide basis for 
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other hand, issues that are repeatedly raised but that, if not addressed, 
would otherwise evade review may be appropriate candidates for a class 
action. For example, class litigation to resolve many categories of veter-
ans' claims before the VA would be more feasible than the current sys-
tem, which ordinarily requires years of individual litigation over common 
claims.299 
Third, agencies may assess whether complex or novel issues need 
time to "percolate" or "mature."30° For example, in the workers' compen-
sation context, occupational disease cases involving complex questions of 
causation may require further factual development. On the other hand, 
in cases involving "signature illnesses" commonly associated with particu-
lar agents (like asbestosis, silicosis, and black lung disease) known to be 
in the same workplace, agencies may reap advantages from concentrating 
claims. Otherwise, repeated hearings may involve the same witnesses, is-
sues, and exhibits throughout trials over several months or years.301 
Finally, the adjudicator must consider whether class-wide relief is 
manageable. Federal courts often deem class actions "unmanageable" 
when they involve too many different issues of law or fact. 302 Such cases 
may involve nationwide classes that seek money for workplace discrimina-
tion on behalf of different parties under different legal theories, lawsuits 
that involve highly fact-based decisions of disability before the Social 
Security Administration, or difficult questions of causation in various lo-
cations and times. However, adjudicators should certify cases when ques-
tions about defendants' liability are more circumscribed in time and 
space and when questions of causation and damages overlap substan-
tially.303 Such questions may include allegations that Social Security 
decertification); In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 
856 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting 23(b) (3)(A) concerns and decertifying class in case where 
each class member had suffered sizeable damages and had emotional stake in litigation). 
299. The backlog of unresolved claims is currently around one million and is ex-
pected to increase to 2.6 million by 2015. Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans' 
Benefits and Due Process, 90 Neb. L. Rev. 388,390 (2011); see also James D. Ridgway, The 
Veterans' Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later: Confronting the New Complexities of 
the Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 251, 268 (2010) (describing 
steady rise of backlogged claims between 2000 and 2008). 
300. Agencies may have less justification than the Supreme Court to permit disparate 
legal positions to "percolate" among their administrative law judges given their mandate to 
implement policy and administer uniform programs rather than merely decide disputes as 
they arise. 
301. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (granting cer-
tification of class action involving asbestos and discussing benefits of class action, including 
saved judicial resources and reduced attorneys' fees); Schwarzer, supra note 240, at 837-38 
(explaining how class actions are seen as remedy to duplicative litigation activity). 
302. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct 2541, 2550-57 (2011) (decertify-
ing nationwide class involving 1.5 million employment discrimination claims). 
303. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 
482, 492 (7th Cir. 2012) (approving Title VII class action against Merrill Lynch, observing 
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decisions rest upon an improper policy that screens out claims for disa-
bility based on a mental illness,304 that immigration judges deny claims 
for asylum by Salvadorans based upon a common assessment of the 
country's socioeconomic conditions,305 or of a common plan to corner 
the futures market from investors in Treasury bills.306 
CertifYing a class at the agency level would give the agency the first 
bite at solving categories of common problems that otherwise may never 
receive a hearing in federal court or-worse yet-reach federal court 
without counsel capable of developing a factual record that describes the 
system-wide harm.307 An agency class action could correct systematic er-
rors in an efficient and consistent manner while affording better access 
to legal representation than a system that requires potential beneficiaries 
to wait while their individual claims work their way through federal court 
and often ends with litde more than a vague command that the agency 
do better. 
2. Legitimate Decisionmaking. - As with civil litigation, agencies 
should encourage independent oversight and claimant participation to 
ensure that parties view the aggregating process as legitimate and fair. 
Large complex cases threaten legitimacy by limiting parties' participation 
in the proceeding or by transforming the judge from an independent 
that "lawsuits will be more complex if, until issue or claim preclusion sets in, the question 
whether Merrill Lynch has violated the antidiscrimination statutes must be determined 
anew in each case"); Me:jdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003) 
("If there are genuinely common issues[,] ... the accuracy of the resolution of which is 
unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially 
when the class is large, to resolve those issues in one fell swoop .... "). 
304. See City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (E.D.N.Y.) ("Contrary 
to legal requirements, the Social Security Administration has consistently followed a policy 
which presumes that mentally disabled claimants who do not meet or equal the listings 
necessarily retain sufficient residual functional capacity to do at least 'unskilled work."'), 
affd, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 
(1985). 
305. See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799-801 (N.D. Cal. 
1991) (approving settlement agreement between class of Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
asylum seekers and government providing for de novo asylum adjudication); Orantes-
Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 372 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (certifYing provisional class of 
Salvadorans challenging asylum practices). 
306. Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 680 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming cer-
tification of class against PIMCO on behalf of buyers of short positions in ten-year 
Treasury notes). 
307. In 2009, 81% of claimants were represented by veteran service organization lay 
representatives. Eight percent of claimants were represented by attorneys; 9% lacked any 
representation at all. See Bd. of Veterans' Appeals, Fiscal Year 2009 Report of the 
Chaim1an 21 (2009), available at http:/ /www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annuai_Rpts/ 
BVA2009AR.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The ban on compensation of at-
torneys was upheld by the Supreme Court in Walters v. Nat' I Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 
473 U.S. 305, 334-45 (1985) (holding that fee limitation violates neither Fifth nor First 
Amendment). 
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neutral into a "manager" interested in saving court resources by broker-
ing a final, global settlement.308 
Federal courts have long sought to provide a legitimate forum to 
conduct mass adjudications impartially and meaningfully. To promote 
impartiality and expertise in multidistrict litigation, a special panel of 
judges may appoint a judge to centralize and oversee claims, based on 
that judge's experience in complex litigation.309 Judges may then appoint 
magistrates or special masters to handle settlement discussions to avoid 
becoming overly invested in the parties' proposed resolution.310 When 
judges actively participate in forging settlements, they may invite a se-
cond judge to review the propriety of the final award or settlement. Fi-
nally,judges themselves are reviewed for any abuse of discretion on inter-
locutory appeal.311 
Accordingly, as with federal multidistrict litigation, only specialized 
ALJs should oversee aggregate proceedings, with special provisions for 
appellate review over the class certification decision and the final judg-
ment. Administrative decisionmakers vary dramatically in their roles and 
responsibilities. Some conduct hearings akin to full-blown trials, while 
others are expected to make more routine decisions without the same 
authority to hear evidence or make policy judgments.312 One can imagine 
settings, particularly when the agency itself is the target of aggregate liti-
gation, where adjudicators would feel pressure not to permit aggregate 
litigation when they otherwise should. Moreover, some agency adjudica-
tors may simply lack the expertise or time to resolve complex multiparty 
308. Resnik, supra note 249, at 425. 
309. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 
(J.P.M.L. 1992) (justifYing selection of forum on basis of "experienced multidistrict trans-
feree judge"); see Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 22.33 ("[T]he Panel 
looks for an available and convenient transfer forum, usually one that ... has a judge with 
some degree of expertise in handling the issues presented .... "). 
310. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 265-67 (E.D. Pa. 
1994) (describing negotiations between plaintiff and defense steering committees), va-
cated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996); Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 22.62 
(describing authority of court to appoint lead counsel or committees of counsel); id. 
§ 22.91 (describing use of special masters or settlement judges to oversee or facilitate set-
tlement). 
311. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(£) (providing interlocutory review of court's decision to 
certifY a class); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (calling for 
"undiluted, even heightened, attention" to adequacy of representation and other class 
certification requirements); Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 21.612 n.965 
(noting courts apply "closer judicial scrutiny" for potential conflicts of interest when "little 
or no discovery" has taken place to test strengths and weaknesses of each party's position). 
312. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass et al., Administrative Law: Cases and Materials 569 (6th 
ed. 2011) (collecting examples and observing that in some cases administrative adjudi-
cation closely resembles court-like hearings while in other cases the judicial analogy is "less 
comfortable"). 
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disputes.313 By assigning specialized ALJs to oversee multiparty disputes, 
agencies would afford more independence and experience in the initial 
decision to certify claims for class-wide treatment without overtaxing 
other kinds of more routine, individualized determinations made by 
agency hearing officers or judges. 
Parties should be able to appeal the agencies' decisions on whether 
to certify a class action or commence a coordinated proceeding to the 
respective agency head, in the same manner that they would appeal 
other ALJ decisions. Interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions 
in federal court pursuant to Rule 23(£) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure limit the discretion of federal district court judges when certi-
fying class actions.314 An appellate mechanism within the agency could 
similarly legitimize the decision of whether to certify a class. 
Finally, agency mass adjudication must ensure meaningful participa-
tion by claimants. Courts have long recognized that agencies may bind 
parties to common findings of law or fact without individualized hearings 
without violating due process.315 Agencies, however, still must provide 
claimants with "some kind of hearing," particularly in cases that may have 
dramatic consequences for their ability to seek asylum, disability 
payments, or medical treatment.316 Federal and state courts offer parties 
a chance to be heard within the practical limits of mass adjudication. 
Aside from providing individual notice of the action to all putative class 
members,317 judges hold fairness hearings designed to solicit objections 
and produce other evidence about the fairness of class certification or 
settlement.318 
313. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 194 (excoriating immigration judges for biased and 
incoherent decisions); see also infra note 359 (discussing enormous backlog of cases faced 
by many ALJs). 
314. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(£) (requiring petition for permission to appeal to be filed 
within fourteen days after certification order is entered); see also Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining 
importance of interlocutory appeal in cases where class certification creates significant 
settlement pressure). 
315. Compare, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468 (1983) (rejecting due 
process challenge because "the Secretary [must] ... determine an issue that is not unique 
to each claimant-the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy"), and 
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (rejecting due 
process challenge because" [w] here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it 
is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption"), with Londoner 
v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908) (holding that for individual taX assessment, "due 
process of law requires that at some stage of the proceedings ... the taxpayer shall have an 
opportunity to be heard ... however informal"). 
316. Friendly, supra note 43, at 1267-69. 
317. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c); see also Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 
(1974) (requiring individualized notice in class action settlements that award damages). 
318. Of course, parties who do not want to participate may opt out of the settlement, 
except in limited, well-defined circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (3) & cmt. (e)(3) 
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Similarly, agencies should attempt to notify parties about the litiga-
tion so they can meaningfully participate, opt out of the case, or object. 
ALJs might also convene fairness hearings to solicit direct input from 
parties. In so doing, agency class actions may promote more legitimacy, 
like their federal court counterparts, giving participants at least some 
chance to have "transformative exchanges about . . . social and moral 
values."319 
3. Loyal Decisionmaking. -Aggregate adjudication should attempt to 
ensure that lawyers and other representatives adequately represent the 
interests of the many people who will not participate directly in the pro-
ceeding and any settlement. Otherwise, aggregate litigation risks disloy-
alty. Participants in many class actions lack rational incentives to monitor 
class counsel when they have comparatively small stakes in the entire en-
terprise.320 In such cases, defense counsel may establish collusive or 
sweetheart deals with plaintiffs' counsel, regardless of their clients' best 
interests. 321 
Courts seek to make aggregate litigation loyal to absent class mem-
bers through subclassing, internal monitoring, additional rights to opt 
out of the litigation, and judicial review. Judges may divide classes of 
people into specific interest groups-called "subclasses"-represented by 
separate counsel who can police each other to prevent overreaching or 
capture by defense counseP22 Moreover, they may appoint class repre-
sentatives with more power to monitor attorneys themselves-like gov-
ernment actors, public interest organizations, or institutional investors.323 
(noting (e)(3) "authorizes the court to refuse to approve a settlement unless the settle-
ment affords class members a new opportunity to request exclusion"). 
319. Resnik eta!., supra note 239, at 382 (summarizing democratic theories involving 
access to litigation). 
320. See Leslie, supra note 251, at 81 (summarizing rea~ons why individual litigants 
with small stakes in complex class actions are unlikely to effectively monitor class counsel). 
Others observe that attorneys lack rational incentives to obtain fair settlements for their 
clients because attorneys may earn large attorneys' fees by settling quickly. See, e.g., 
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 251, at 503 ("Given the time value of the money 
the attorney has invested in a case, he or she has a substantial incentive to reach a settle-
ment and collect a contingency fee sooner rather than later."). 
321. See Coffee, Regulation, supra note 250, at 883-89 (describing possibility of 
"sweetheart settlements" arising for benefit of defendant and class counsel); Hay, supra 
note 250, at 479 (articulating concerns about class counsel "selling out" and settling for 
less than reasonably possible); see also, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 645 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) ("Class counsel's fee application is presented to the court with the enthu-
siastic endorsement, or at least acquiescence, of the lawye1·s on both sides of the litigation, 
a situation virtually designed to conceal any problems with the settlement not in the inter-
ests of the lawyers to disclose."). 
322. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5); see Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, 
§ 21.23 ("Subclasses must be created when differences in the positions of class members 
require separate representatives and separate counsel."). 
323. See ALI Report, supra note 37, § l.05(c) (2) (recommending judges name plain-
tiffs with "sizable stakes" in charge of litigation when possible); see also James D. Cox & 
2012] AGENCY CLASS ACTION 2057 
Recent reforms to class actions and other mass litigation give people 
more rights to not participate in the class-wide decision, or "opt out," as a 
way to signal that class counsel may not adequately represent the inter-
ests of the parties.324 
Courts also review settlement decisions, as well as attorneys' fee ar-
rangements, to police potential conflicts of interest between counsel and 
the represented parties.325 Judges may also require counsel, mediators, or 
experts in the settlement to offer detailed explanations for their deci-
sions in order to police against possible collusion.326 Judges also evaluate 
conflicts within the class, scrutinizing outcomes that award more to some 
class members at the expense of others.327 
Agencies should adopt rules to ensure that counsel and other repre-
sentatives fairly represent the interests of the parties. When necessary, 
they could use subclassing, with separate counsel for each subgroup to 
police each other's interests. Requiring representatives from different 
Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in 
Securities Class Actions, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587, 1588-89 (2006) (discussing role of lead 
plaintiff in securities fraud class actions as monitoring conduct of class counsel); Elliott]. 
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Inves-
tors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale LJ. 2053, 2057-58 
(1995) (arguing that institutional investor would be more likely to serve as "litigation mon-
itor" if made lead plaintiff, but claiming judicial practices discourage such assignment). 
324. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1419, 1441 (2003) (arguing that individuals who opt out are signaling dissatisfaction with 
suit and protecting their own interests); Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out, supra note 
236, at 22-23 (explaining rationale behind second opt-out opportunity for class action 
settlements was to provide class members more opportunity to appraise value of settle-
ment). 
325. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 21.612 n.965 (collecting cases 
supporting argument that "[c]lass actions certified solely for settlement ... sometimes 
make meaningful judicial review more difficult and more important"). 
326. See, e.g., Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding district 
court had not abused discretion in approving settlement and finding collusion unlikely in 
part because it had properly given weight to qualifications of class counsel); Murillo v. 
Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 921 F. Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (requiring that counsel en-
gage in "sufficient discovery" in order to receive "initial presumption of fairness"); Manual 
for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 21.612 (collecting cases where courts applied 
"closer judicial scrutiny" for potential conflicts of interest, particularly when there has 
been "limited or no discovery" to test strengths and weaknesses of each party's position). 
327. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) (reject-
ing class certification in part because class members' interests were not aligned); Synfuel 
Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2006) (vacating 
district court's approval of settlement agreement in part because it was more advantageous 
to some class members than others); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785-86 
(7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting settlement when certain class members' claims were settled for 
no consideration without reasoned explanation); see also Coffee, Conflicts, supra note 
279, at 1545 (observing occasions when class counsel will have no incentive to "resist an 
allocation plan favored by the defendant, who often has an interest in preferring one sub-
group within the class over another"). 
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interest groups to participate in agency decisionmaking is not uncom-
mon, and adopting such a rule in administrative proceedings is not unu-
sual or unfamiliar.328 Moreover, ALJs, like Article Ill judges, could review 
attorney representatives for potential conflicts of interest.329 To do so, as 
in civil litigation, ALJs may appoint counsel or class representatives with 
large stakes in the litigation, such as state pension funds in securities res-
titution cases or public interest law offices that represent thousands of 
individuals in Social Security or immigration cases. They could also re-
quire counsel, mediators, or experts in the litigation to explain their de-
cisions,330 paying particular attention if mass settlements award more to 
some class members at the expense of others.331 Finally, they may review 
the rate at which people opt out or object during the fairness hearings 
described above to check abuses by class counsel or their representatives. 
Even in an informally aggregated action, like those involving coal 
miners or other workplace injury victims, agencies would still need to 
police against conflicts of interest to ensure that plaintiffs' counsel re-
main loyal to their clients. Informally aggregated lawsuits involve the 
same plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel, who, like other "repeat players," 
may push their clients to accept unreasonable outcomes or settlements to 
preserve their own working relationship or the promise of fees in subse-
quent cases. Specialization among plaintiffs' counsel may minimize some 
conflicts. For example, a steering committee of qualified plaintiffs' coun-
sel would develop common questions about the workplace, common wit-
nesses, and common scientific evidence for trial; individually appointed 
attorneys for each claimant could then use that common work product, 
sometimes referred to as a "trial in a box," in individual proceedings.332 
328. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2006), and the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, id. §§ 571-583, authorize agencies to directly in-
volve stakeholders in the decisionmaking process. Other agencies, like the EPA, similarly 
allow such collaborative approaches. See, e.g., Joseph A. Siegel, Collaborative Decision 
Making on Climate Change in the Federal Government, 27 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 257, 285-87 
(2009) (describing process where EPA conducted extensive outreach and held more than 
100 meetings with interested stakeholders including trade associations, industry repre-
sentatives, and state, local, and tribal government). For an extensive review of such collab-
orative approaches, see Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 33-36 (1997) (illustrating instances of interest group participa-
tion and recommending new "collaborative model" to involve groups in agency deci-
sionmaking). 
329. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 21.612 & n.965 (collecting 
cases claiming "[c]lass actions certified solely for settlement ... sometimes make meaning-
ful judicial review more difficult and more important"). 
330. See supra note 326 (describing courts' scrutiny of class counsel). 
331. See supra note 327 (describing judicial responses to outcomes that treat class 
members differently). 
332. See Robert L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: Past Efficacy and Future Prom-
ise, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1721, 1742-43 (2008) (describing "trial in a box" process by which 
plaintiffs' counsel coordinated with each other on "micromanagement issues: which doc-
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Agencies may need slightly different tools to police the loyalty of 
representatives to absent parties or class members in "public rights" 
cases, where the government itself is the target of the dispute. When such 
parties and the agency agree to a settlement, an ALJ may not be able to 
independently evaluate whether the settlement, which was forged by an-
other branch of the agency, was "fair, reasonable, and adequate." In such 
cases, federal court review may be the only way to ensure that class repre-
sentatives and counsel remained loyal to the absent parties. 
But even in restitution cases, agencies may have different interests 
from the victims they compensate, thereby warranting another layer of 
federal court oversight. Agencies may seek quick restitution settlements 
to resolve embarrassing missteps in regulatory policy;333 or, most im-
portantly, after reaching a settlement, agencies may lack incentives and 
input to address victims' interests.334 Out of respect for the agencies' de-
cisionmaking process and resources, however, federal courts would not 
examine restitution actions with the same scrutiny. But courts could re-
view agency decisions with a "hard look" to determine whether the 
agency explained and justified its decisionmaking process and whether 
the process was reasonable.335 
uments to rely on, which lines of argument to pursue, and which expert witnesses to call"); 
Heather Won Tesoriero, Vioxx 'Trial in a Box' Cuts Cost of Filing Suit, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 
2006, at B1 (explaining logistics and benefits of "premade trial package" created by steer-
ing committee ofVioxx plaintiffs' attorneys for Vioxx cases). 
333. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(observing settlement between SEC and Bank of America suggested "a rather cynical 
relationship between the parties"); SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 412 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting SEC could have saved $79 million if it corrected mistake earlier). 
334. See Bear, Steams & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d at 411-12 (revealing problems with 
distribution of funds because "[w]hile the SEC professed its interest in restitution, it did 
not focus its considerable analytical resources on the identification of relevant securities, 
time frames and potential claims"). 
335. Hard look review is already a well-established doctrine in the review of agency 
decisions. See, e.g., Nat'! Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 & n.l26 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(discussing roots of hard look review); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Ac-
countability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 Duke LJ. 2125, 2181 (2009) (describing hard 
look review as tool "to ensure that agencies disclose relevant data and provide reasoned 
responses to material objections raised during the rulemaking process"). Hard look review 
requires courts to evaluate whether an agency action was arbitrary or capricious by consid-
ering whether the agency engaged in "reasoned decisionmaking." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983). Under hard look review, a 
court would not scrutinize the compensation terms of a settlement agreement de novo. 
Agencies would, however, be expected to explain how they calculated victims' losses, how 
they identified victims shared and conflicting interests, and how they balanced those in-
terests against other regulatory objectives in the settlement, such as the agencies legitimate 
interest in conserving resources or punishing regulatory violations. Zimmerman, Distrib-
uting justice, supra note 37, at 569-71 (arguing for hard look review of agency restitution 
settlements). 
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4. Accurate Deoisionmaking. - Finally, administrative agencies need 
evaluative rules to ensure the final resolution in aggregate litigation is 
appropriately tailored to the strengths and weaknesses of the class mem-
bers' different legal claims.336 Otherwise, aggregate litigation threatens 
accuracy by "averaging" claim values among parties with different injuries 
or by favoring the interests of some plaintiffs over others. Because class 
actions bind large groups of people in the same way, the accuracy of the 
decisions becomes even more important than in an individual case. A 
large proceeding or settlement should at least guarantee that more de-
serving claimants receive more than less deserving claimants and that like 
claimants receive similar awards. 
Mass adjudication already arguably promotes accuracy through the 
aggregation process itself. Under the law of large numbers, assessments 
about similar complaints improve as the sample of any given population 
increases. 337 Moreover, as attorneys pool resources, large proceedings 
provide adjudicators with more information about the best ways to craft 
any kind of final relief. However, large cases may also increase the magni-
tude of any errors, particularly for marginal cases.338 
336. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (delineating procedures for class action settle-
ment, voluntary dismissal, or compromise); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: 
Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435, 1468 (2006) [hereinafter 
Rubenstein, Fairness] (interpreting Rule 23( e)). 
337. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 288, at 614 ("[W]ith a large enough set of cases, the 
sample average gives a more accurate estimate of the population mean than an individual 
trial verdict gives of actual damages for a single case."); Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. 
Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Prob-
abilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 247, 248 (1990) (noting that although 
courts should carefully determine validity of probabilistic evidence, "overtly probabilistic 
evidence is no less probative of legally material facts than other types of evidence"); 
Laurens Walker &John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 Va. L. Rev. 329, 347 (1999) (ex-
plaining that using statistical evidence is practical method for mass trial). To be sure, ag-
gressive aggregation of very diverse claims can distort outcomes, too. See, e.g., Richard A. 
Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 
475, 509 (2003) ("The need to preserve a class action at all costs drives a court to distort 
the underlying theory of substantive liability beyond recognition."); Richard A. Nagareda, 
Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 104 (2009) (cri-
tiquing use of aggregate proof in sprawling nationwide class actions). The potential threat 
of distortion in highly variable, fact-dependent cases should not prevent agencies from 
using aggregation techniques in cases raising common questions. Statistical aggregation, 
however, does require agencies to adopt other techniques this Article recommends to sort 
out common claims from variable ones-by accounting for, among other things, the ex-
tent to which the litigation has progressed, the maturity of the litigation, and whether 
class-wide relief is manageable. See Part III.C.1 (discussing how to make agency class 
actions feasible by using threshold requirements to screen out claims better suited for 
individual adjudication). 
338. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 
482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) ("If resisting a class action requires betting one's company on a 
single jury verdict, a defendant may be forced to settle; and this is an argument against 
definitively resolving an issue in a single case if enormous consequences ride on that reso-
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For that reason, federal rules have long relied upon judicial review, 
statistical aggregation, and bellwether trials to improve accuracy in mass 
adjudication. First, federal rules require courts to evaluate whether the 
settlement reflects the relative merits of plaintiffs' claims.339 In a large 
proceeding, the settlement should at least guarantee "vertical equity" 
(that more deserving claimants receive more than less deserving claim-
ants) and "horizontal equity" (that similarly situated claimants receive 
similar awards). Courts may also take into account "rough justice" prin-
ciples.340 Rough justice means that representatives may adjust or average 
settlement amounts in light of the practical limitations of compensating 
many people through a massive settlement scheme.341 
Courts rely upon sampling or bellwether trials that assess the merits 
of different categories of claims, class-wide resolutions of declaratory re-
lief, and bureaucratic grids. 342 Sampling uses a subset of individuals from 
within a population to yield some knowledge about the whole popula-
tion.343 Sampling lowers costs, speeds data collection, and, because the 
sample surveyed is smaller, ensures higher quality and more consistency 
in the information gathered.344 Judges may rely upon statistical sampling, 
lution."); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7Jh Cir. 1995) 
(noting potential unpredictability and unfairness of allowing single jury to decide class of 
cases). 
339. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (guiding class action settlement procedure); 
Rubenstein, Fairness, supra note 336, at 1468 (explaining that judge's primary concern in 
determining whether class action settlement is fair is with settlement's substantive terms); 
see also supra note 275 and accompanying text (exploring criteria of determining fairness 
of settlement). 
340. See, e.g., ALI Report, supra note 37, § 1.04 cmt. f (observing that large com-
pensation funds implicate values of merit, equality, and "[r]oughjustice[,] ... where bar-
gaining allows risk aversion, the ability to endure delay, and other arbitrary factors to af-
fect claim values"); Diller, supra note 217, at 737-38 (describing hybrid principles of com-
pensation in class action settlements). 
341. For example, it is not uncommon for a large settlement fund to follow "damage 
averaging," using grids or compensation schemes that ignore some components of indi-
vidual claims to expedite payment to many different people. ALI Report, supra note 37, 
§ 1.04 cmt. f; see also In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 342 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (garnering cases and explaining"' [f]luid recovedes' of this type, which do 
not call for direct calculation and distribution of precise recoveries to the class members, 
can be a fair means of delivering value to class members without undue administrative 
costs"). 
342. See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5Jh Cir. 1997) (describing 
benefits of bellwether trials); Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 22.315 (de-
scribing function of bellwether trials). 
343. See David H. Kaye & David H. Freeman, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Reference Guide on 
Statistics, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 211, 223-25 (3d ed. 2011) (describ-
ing common sampling methods). 
344. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 11.493 ("Acceptable sam-
pling techniques, in lieu of discovery and presentation of voluminous data from the entire 
population, can save substantial time and expense .... "); see also supra note 337 (collect-
ing literature supporting use of statistical sampling in mass adjudication). 
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long used in administrative rulemaking,345 in different areas of mass adju-
dication to identify the strengths and weaknesses of high volume cases.346 
Finally, judges may conduct bellwether trials: 
In a bellwether trial procedure, a random sample of cases large 
enough to yield reliable results is tried to a jury. A judge, jury, 
or participating lawyers use the resulting verdicts as a basis for 
resolving the remaining cases. Judges currently use bellwether 
trials informally in mass tort litigation to assist in valuing cases 
and to encourage settlement .... These trials promote a type of 
"group typical" justice that is at once participatory and collec-
tive.341 
Agencies could use many of these techniques in private rights and 
restitution cases.348 For example, in black lung cases, an ALJ could con-
duct bellwether trials-using representative test trials of particular kinds 
of respiratory disease-to streamline other cases. Should the litigation 
result in a settlement with the mining company or its insurer, aggregated 
proceedings would afford plaintiffs more leverage at the negotiation ta-
ble. Similar techniques may improve large restitution settlements sought 
by agencies against corporate defendants on behalf of large groups of 
victims, like recent settlements between the SEC, FTC, and OCC and 
large national banks arising out of the mortgage crisis.349 To ensure fair 
determinations about eligibility, awards, and evidentiary standards, the 
ALJ could accept expert surveys from the parties. Those kinds of submis-
sions are routinely used in federal courts to justify distribution schemes 
in large shareholder class actions.350 Statistical techniques may provide 
more accurate information about the absent plaintiffs' total claims, 
which in tum may save administrative costs when distributing awards. 
345. See, e.g., United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 247-48 (2002) (ap-
proving IRS's use of aggregate estimation to determine unreported tips by restaurant em-
ployees); Mich. Dep't ofEduc. v. U.S. Dep't ofEduc., 875 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(allowing use of stratified random sample of 259 out of 66,368 authorizations as repre-
sentative oflarger pool). 
346. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 81, § 11.422 (noting that when it 
is necessary to limit discovery, "statistical sampling techniques [may be used] to measure 
whether the results of the discovery fairly represent what unrestricted discovery would 
have been expected to produce"); id. § 11.493 ("Acceptable sampling techniques, in lieu 
of discovery and presentation of voluminous data from the entire population, can save 
substantial time and expense .... "). 
347. Lahav, Bellwether, supra note 288, at 577-78 (arguing for collective justice 
through bellwether trials based on "democratic participation values"). 
348. They may raise due process concems, however, in many public rights cases. 
349. See infra notes 18-22 and 57-63 (discussing recent settlements and explaining 
consequences oflack of aggregation procedures). 
350. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class Actions-Claims 
Administration, 35 J. Corp. L. 123, 132 (2009) (describing efforts to use "state of the art 
surveys" and other methodologies to improve decisionmaking in class settlement distribu-
tions). 
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By using sampling and bellwether trials for different categories of 
claimants, agencies may establish presumptive ways to measure claims 
accurately and consistently, without unduly sacrificing participation by 
parties directly impacted by the agencies' actions. 
*** 
Class actions do not offer the only, or the perfect, model for proce-
dural justice in complex cases. Any solution to relieve overburdened ad-
ministrative dockets and afford more access to justice should also con-
sider other proposed reforms, like improved attorneys' fee provisions, 
greater administrative independence and management, more responsive 
rulemaking procedures, and greater access to federal courts. Moreover, 
class actions contain risks of their own. Plaintiffs' class counsel may forge 
collusive settlements for their own financial benefit;351 expensive proce-
dures, like personalized notice, are not always justified-particularly 
when the settlement only offers class members very small awards or cou-
pons;352 and, to the extent class actions settle, they may adopt the very 
bureaucratic procedures that agencies use-relying upon limited varia-
bles and grids to resolve competing claims, with limited direct participa-
tion by, or on behalf of, victims.353 
Nevertheless, agencies can contain the risks associated with aggre-
gate litigation by adopting the best practices outlined above to ensure 
agency adjudication remains feasible, legitimate, loyal, and accurate. 
More importantly, without any aggregate procedures to resolve complex, 
repetitive litigation, administrative agencies risk the foundational goals 
that class actions were also developed to serve-affordable legal access, 
efficient decisionmaking, and consistent and fair outcomes. 
D. Enhancing Agency Control of Policymaking 
Not only can aggregated adjudication produce benefits for the non-
governmental parties that depend upon them, the agency class action 
should also enhance agency control of policymaking through adjudica-
tion. This may not seem obvious at first. Empowering independent adju-
351. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (acknowledg-
ing possibility of collusion in class action settlements); Effron, supra note 34, at 2033 (col-
lecting commentary criticizing class settlements where "plaintiffs' lawyers walk away with 
hefty fees from a favorable settlement [and] plaintiffs recoup little, if any, of the award"). 
352. See, e.g., ALI Report, supra note 37, § 3.04 (recommending courts weigh "cost 
of notice and the likely recovery involved" to determine whether individual notice is nec-
essary); id § 3.04 cmt. a ("In many cases, personal notice may not make economic sense."); 
Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97, 106-09 (crit-
icizing individual notice requirement). 
353. Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 57-70 (2007) (de-
scribing use of grids in mass tort settlements and other compensation schemes); 
Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 35, at 155-62 (describing examples and critiques 
of grids used in large settlement funds). 
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dicators to decide broad questions of law or fact will effectively give ALJs 
a great deal of policymaking authority. Yet Congress generally vests au-
thority to set agency policy in appointed agency heads,354 who are ac-
countable to the political branches.355 Thus, the agency class action 
might seem to grant ALJs powers beyond their pay grade. Moreover, as 
discussed above,356 the APA has attempted to shield ALJs from political 
pressure within agencies. This independence is an asset when providing 
individuals in administrative proceedings with a neutral decisionmaker, 
but it can be a liability when it comes to ensuring effective control of 
agency policymaking. ALJs imbued with sweeping powers risk undermin-
ing the policy goals of the appointed agency heads. Nevertheless, im-
portant distinctions between administrative and judicial adjudication 
should allow aggregation to enhance rather than hinder agency auton-
omy. 
To begin, in most cases the agency head has the power to accept or 
reject an ALJ's decision. The agency head, or the body granted final 
agency decisionmaking power, such as the BIA in the case of deportation 
and removal proceedings, owes the ALJ no deference on questions of law 
or policy and may substitute its own decision for the ALJ's. 357 The ALJ's 
fact-finding is somewhat more difficult for the agency to second-guess, 
354. See, e.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2006) (dele-
gating to Secretary of Labor power to set occupational safety or health standards); Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(l) (2006) (delegating to Administrator of EPA power to set 
standards applicable to emission of air pollutants from new motor vehicles); Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (a) (2006) (delegating to Secretary of Transportation 
power to set motor vehicle safety standards); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Admin-
istration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2250 (2001) (noting Congress usually delegates deci-
sionmaking authority to head of agency rather than president); Robert V. Percival, Who's 
in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Deci-
sions?, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2487, 2487 (2011) ("Most regulatory statutes specify that 
agency heads rather than the President shall make regulatory decisions."). 
355. There is a substantial literature discussing the accountability of the administra-
tive state to Congress, see generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 
San Diego L. Rev. 61, 69-144 (2006) (reviewing congressional control over administrative 
state), and to the President, see generally Kagan, supra note 354, at 2272-319 (reviewing 
presidential control of administrative state); Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of 
Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443, 462 ( 1987) (arguing that while 
president has supervisory responsibility of administrative state, president should not dic-
tate outcome of decisions vested by Congress in agencies); Percival, supra note 354, at 
2490--538 (reviewing president's supervisory powers over administrative state). 
356. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which APA 
protects ALJs from political pressures). 
357. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) ("On appeal from or review of the initial 
[ALJ) decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial 
decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. 
Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977, 985 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting judicial deference to agency in-
terpretations of Black Lung Benefits Act is specifically owed to director of Office of 
Workers Compensation, not to ALJ). 
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but even here the agency can overrule the ALJ's determinations with a 
good reason derived from its experience and expertise.358 
The problem that agency heads face is not the lack of formal power 
to control ALJs, but the lack of practical ability. Put simply, in many 
agencies ALJs issue far more decisions than the agency heads can ade-
quately review.359 The agency class action offers relief to overburdened 
agencies by aggregating multiple cases in a single proceeding, thus re-
ducing the sheer number of cases that the agency must review. Moreover, 
aggregating cases will inevitably raise their profile in the agency, enabling 
the agency to allocate its resources for ALJ review where it matters 
most-in cases that affect large groups of individuals in agency proceed-
ings. Therefore, while aggregation increases the power of ALJs, it also 
increases the practical ability of agency heads to review ALJ decisions. 
Second, the additional time that the agency can spend on aggre-
gated proceedings by eliminating duplicative efforts will enable the 
agency to publish its decisions in these cases as precedential rulings to 
guide ALJs in future cases. Thus, the agency head will be able to influ-
ence not only the aggregated case on direct review, but future adminis-
trative proceedings as well, all with a single decision. 
Third, the agency class action will provide the agency head a 
thoughtful first crack at important questions of law and policy by the 
agency's most experienced and expert ALJs, with the benefit of a fully 
developed record and competent counsel. The agency will remain free to 
modify ALJ policymaking decisions as appropriate, either upon direct 
review or in a future rulemaking proceeding. If the agency decides to 
institute notice and comment rulemaking to address an issue arising in 
aggregated a<ljudication, it will have the benefit of the ALJ's considered 
opinion. 
Fourth, aggregated cases will be more transparent to the political 
branches, which are rarely concerned with the outcomes of individual 
adjudications beyond the provision of constituent services by individual 
representatives.360 Thus, in addition to increasing the power of agency 
358. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495-97 (1951) (recognizing 
that evidence supporting agency's findings of fact on judicial review "may be less substan-
tial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived 
with the case has drawn conclusions different from the [agency's] than when he has 
reached the same conclusion"); NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 432 (2d 
Cir. 1951) (noting agency may reach its own "secondary inferences" concerning evidence 
before AlJ unless inferences are irrational). 
359. During the 2011 fiscal year the Social Security Administration Appeals Council 
processed 126,992 requests for review and still had 153,004 requests for review pending. 
See supra note 157 and accompanying text. The BlA decided 38,369 appeals in 2008 and 
still had 28,874 pending. ABA, Reforming the Immigration System, supra note 2, at 3-11 
tbl.3-l. 
360. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926-27 (1983) (noting Congress's lack of 
attention when reviewing order to suspend Chadha's ,deportation, including inaction for 
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heads over significant issues that affect large groups of people, the 
agency class action will also increase the ability of the political branches 
to ensure agency accountability.361 
In sum, while the agency class action will undoubtedly increase the 
stakes in agency adjudications, it will also facilitate agency control over 
significant cases that affect large groups and implicate important agency 
policies. 
CONCLUSION 
Many commentators have described class action hearings and set-
tlements as a form of "private administrative law."362 Many aggregate set-
tlements in federal court borrow bureaucratic rules from administrative 
law to streamline the adjudication of claims for individual members of a 
class. The agency class action, in many ways, represents just the opposite: 
borrowing rules from private class action litigation to better resolve dis-
putes within a public agency. 
In so doing, the agency class action responds to two emerging trends 
that threaten administrative law's foundational goals of efficiency, con-
sistency, and legal access to government. First, as administrative law ex-
pands into new areas of dispute resolution,363 agencies require more cre-
ative solutions to the flood of new cases that demand just and speedy res-
olution. Second, as the ability of Article III courts to hear class actions 
and other forms of aggregate litigation is restricted, agencies will feel 
more pressure to make decisions that involve the same categories of 
people more accurately and fairly. 364 Current tools in administrative 
year and a half, not exercising veto authority for significant period of time, not printing or 
distributing resolution denying Chadha permanent residence status when House of 
Representatives voted, and lack of debate or recorded vote). 
361. Of course, in some cases political scrutiny may make it more difficult for the 
agency to reach an accommodation with injured parties. A federal class action lawsuit may 
offer a convenient excuse for a settlement that the agency's political masters would find 
unsatisfactory. 
362. See, e.g., Lahav, Numbers, supra note 32, at 390--92 (examining quasi-
administrative structure of class action settlement systems); Nagareda, Turning from Tort, 
supra note 39, at 945-52 (suggesting courts draw from administrative law framework to 
evaluate fairness of mass tort settlements); Resnik, supra note 249, at 425-30 (discussing 
role of judge as manager in mass settlement contexts). 
363. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text (discussing specific areaS into 
which administrative dispute resolution has expanded and potentially could expand). 
364. Compare, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (re-
jecting nationwide class action for sex discrimination on behalf of Wal-Mart employees), 
and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (preempting state 
rule permitting class actions involving arbitration agreements under Federal Arbitration 
Act), with Kevin P. McGowan, OFCCP: DOL Taking More Active Enforcement Role on 
OFCCP Issues, Department Lawyers Say, BNA Daily Lab. Rep., July 28, 2011, at C-1 (de-
scribing new Department of Labor enforcement of sex discrimination claims and observ-
ing that recent Supreme Court class action decisions do not apply to executive agencies). 
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law-rulemaking, stare decisis, attorneys' fees statutes, judicial review, 
federal court class actions, and informal aggregation-cannot by them-
selves adequately meet these demands. But by adopting procedures from 
the class action and complex litigation, agencies may provide citizens 
who depend upon the administrative state more efficiency, consistency, 
and voice in their own redress. 
